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The use of force by police officers has captured the attention of society. 
Allegations of inappropriate or misapplied force happen with regularity. This 
thesis conducted a survey of the members of the International Association of 
Directors of Law Enforcement Standards and Training to determine the number 
of training hours dedicated to firearms and force versus de-escalation topics. It 
analyzes the results through the framework of the Recognition-Primed Decision 
model, which asserts that in rapidly evolving, time-limited incidents, individuals 
make decisions based on prior experiences. This thesis hypothesizes that 
officers are primed to use force rather than de-escalation options due to an 
overemphasis on force during training sessions. The survey results showed 
an 8.9 to 1 ratio of training hours on force versus de-escalation. It recommends 
that police trainers strive to achieve parity in training hours dedicated to force 
and de-escalation topics. It also recommends that scenario-based training 
be emphasized to provide experiences to draw upon, and that the scenarios 
mirror real-world probabilities. Positioning Theory, Crisis Intervention Team 
principles, and de-escalation strategies of other countries are also examined 
for methods that could be implemented to reduce the occurrences of 
inappropriate use of force by police officers.  
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Beginning in 2014, there has been a fevered national conversation about 
the use of force by police officers. The ubiquity of public and private video 
cameras has flooded social and traditional media with recordings of officers using 
force against citizens. The wide dissemination of video recordings that cast law 
enforcement in a negative light has led to public outcry for substantive changes 
to the manner in which officers use force against citizens. In answer to the 
demands for a transformation of how police use force, this thesis proposes 
modifications to the training curriculum delivered to law enforcement officers.  
In 2015, the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) conducted a 
survey of 280 law enforcement agencies to determine the number of training 
hours recruit academies assigned to use of force topics versus de-escalation 
topics.1 The results of the PERF survey found that for every one hour of training 
devoted to studying de-escalation techniques, there were eight hours of training 
dedicated to learning about using some type of force.2 This thesis conducted a 
similar survey with the members of the International Association of Directors of 
Law Enforcement Standards and Training (IADLEST). The executive over police 
standards and training in each state in the United States is a member of 
IADLEST. The survey administered to the IADLEST members resulted in an 8.9 
to 1 ratio of training hours of force to de-escalation. Both the PERF survey and 
the IADLEST survey show a gross imbalance in what is emphasized during 
police recruit training. The results of the PERF and IADLEST surveys are 
graphically displayed in Figure 1. 
 
                                            
1 “Re-Engineering Training On Police Use of Force,” Police Executive Research Forum, 




PERF data obtained from PERF report.3 
Figure 1. Aggregation of PERF and IADLEST Surveys.4 
 
Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) was applied to the results of the 
PERF and IADLEST surveys to gain understanding as to why some police 
officers might inappropriately use force. The RPD model claims that in time 
limited and volatile situations, individuals naturally make decisions based on prior 
experiences.5 Individuals quickly assess the situation, recall previously 
encountered situations of a similar nature, and select a course of action based on 
the prior occurrences that have had successful outcomes.6 Analyzing the results 
of the PERF and IADLEST surveys through the RPD framework supports the 
hypothesis that police officers are primed to use force options instead of de-
escalation techniques since force is overemphasized during training. 
                                            
3 Adapted from “Re-Engineering Training On Police Use of Force,” Police Executive 
Research Forum, August 2015, 11, http://www.policeforum.org/assets/reengineeringtraining1.pdf.  
4 Ibid. 
5 Gary A. Klein, “Naturalistic Decision Making,” Human Factors 3, June 2008, 456–460, doi: 
10.1518/001872008X288385.  
6 Gary A. Klein, “Recognition-Primed Decision,” Gary A. Klein Associates Inc., Fairborn, OH, 
138, http://www.ise.ncsu.edu/nsf_itr/794B/papers/Klein_1989_AMMSR_RPDM.pdf. 
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Based on the results of the surveys and the analysis using the RPD 
framework, this thesis recommends achieving parity between force and de-
escalation training hours in police recruit training and in-service training. It also 
suggests an emphasis in role-playing exercises focused on successful 
application of de-escalation strategies to provide officers with an experience base 
to draw upon when they are confronted with volatile encounters with citizens.   
This thesis covers other subjects related to the use of force by police 
officers, one of which is Positioning Theory (PT). PT describes how individuals 
assume and project rights and duties to one another during encounters.7 The 
principles of PT bring understanding to human interactions and provide strategies 
to promote peace rather than foment conflict.8 This thesis also reviews the 
warrior versus guardian debate through the lens of PT.9 An argument is made 
that neither label should be applied to police officers. Ascribing equal rights and 
duties to all members of society eliminates in-group versus out-group 
divisiveness fostered by superordinate labels.10 
The de-escalation techniques of the Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) model 
are evaluated to ascertain if all law enforcement officers could benefit from using 
them. However, this thesis found that current research does not support their 
effectiveness in reducing the force use by police officers during confrontations 
with individuals suffering mental health crises.11 No research has been 
                                            
7 Fathali Moghaddam and Rom Harré, Words of Conflict, Words of War (Santa Barbara, 
California: Praeger, 2010), 2. 
8 Nikki Slocum-Bradley, Promoting Conflict or Peace Through Identity, (Burlington, Vermont: 
Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008), 8–9. 
9 “The President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing,” Office of Community Oriented 
Policing Services, May 2015, 9 and19, http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/
taskforce_finalreport.pdf. 
10 Nikki Slocum-Bradley, Promoting Conflict or Peace Through Identity (Burlington, Vermont: 
Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008), 8. 
11 Sema A. Taheri, “Do Crisis Intervention Teams Reduce Arrests and Improve Officer 
Safety? A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis,” Criminal Justice Policy Review (November 5, 
2014): 79, doi: 10.1177/0887403414556289. 
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conducted to determine whether CIT techniques could be efficacious for general 
law enforcement purposes.  
This thesis reviews the de-escalation strategies of other countries for 
possible adoption by the police in the United States. It is recommended that 
officers in the United States not implement an adapted model of the United 
Kingdom’s National Decision Model (NDM) as proposed by PERF.12 The 
availability of firearms in the United States versus the United Kingdom makes the 
complex NDM problematic for use in the United States.13 This thesis 
recommends adopting the principles of Project Beacon from Victoria (Australia), 
and emphasizing scenario-based training as is done in Tasmania (Australia).14  
  
                                            
12 “Guiding Principles on Use of Force,” Police Executive Research Forum, January 29, 
2016, 41 and 53, http://www.policeforum.org/assets/30%20guiding%20principles.pdf.  
13 Daniel W. Webster and Jon S. Vernick, Reducing Gun Violence in America (Baltimore, 
Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press), 186 and 191. 
14 Tim Prenzler, Louise Porter, and Geoffrey P. Alpert, “Reducing Police Use of Force: Case 
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The killing of an unarmed teenager by a Ferguson, Missouri police officer 
in August 2014 brought greater attention across the United States to the 
challenge of finding ways to reduce the amount of force used by law enforcement 
officers.1 Various remedies have been suggested, such as mandating that police 
officers wear body cameras.2 However, body-worn cameras are only a partial 
answer. They document events but do not provide alternatives to using force. A 
second response to the perceived misuse of force has been the prosecution of 
police officers for charges spanning the spectrum of battery to murder. Post-
incident actions address alleged illegal behavior, but they are responses to 
inappropriately applied force rather than prevention strategies. Research needs 
to be conducted to help develop more effective methods and strategies to 
alleviate the instances of misapplied and excessive use of force. 
Novice police officers learn how to handle real-world situations by 
acquiring skills in basic recruit academies. However, depending on what is 
emphasized during training, officers may develop a false sense of reality and an 
over reliance on skills that are not appropriate in every circumstance. For 
example, if firearms are predominately required to successfully resolve training 
scenarios, firearms might be what police officers instinctively use when hostile 
situations are encountered. 
 The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) conducted a survey of 280 
police agencies in 2015 that documented the gross imbalance of force training 
and de-escalation training in the United States.3  The PERF survey results 
revealed that the median number of hours new police recruits were taught about 
                                            
1 “Re-Engineering Training On Police Use of Force,” Police Executive Research Forum, 
August 2015, 9, http://www.policeforum.org/assets/reengineeringtraining1.pdf. 2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid., 11.  
 2 
force was 129 hours.4 On the other hand, police recruits were given a median 
number of only 16 hours to learn about de-escalation, or how to avoid using 
force.5 
A. PURPOSE STATEMENT 
The purpose of this study is to provide an analysis of the number of 
training hours given to new police officers on the topics of force and de-
escalation. This is important because the content of training courses influences 
what tactics officers use during encounters with the public. It is theorized that if 
force tactics are the predominant skills taught in police training academies, 
officers will be primed to use force options rather than de-escalation techniques.  
A survey similar to the PERF survey was conducted for this thesis with the 
International Association of Directors of Law Enforcement Standards and 
Training (IADLEST). The results of the IADLEST survey and the PERF survey 
will be analyzed through the lens of the Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) 
model of decision-making. The premise of RPD is that individuals confronted with 
a time-limited, escalating situation will make decisions based on prior 
experiences that match or closely match the circumstances being faced.6 This 
thesis posits that police training should provide as many hours on de-escalation 
techniques as on force tactics so that officers have a broad range of effective 
skills to safely restore peace in tumultuous encounters.  
This thesis also explores Positioning Theory (PT), Crisis Intervention 
Teams (CITs), and de-escalation strategies from other countries as possible 
methods that could be employed to reduce the use of force by police officers. 
Additionally, an examination of the warrior versus guardian debate will be 
conducted, and PT principles will be applied to bring a viable resolution to the 
                                            
4 Ibid.  
5 Ibid.  
6 Gary A. Klein, “Recognition-Primed Decision,” Gary A. Klein Associates Inc., Fairborn, OH, 
142–143, http://www.ise.ncsu.edu/nsf_itr/794B/papers/Klein_1989_AMMSR_RPDM.pdf. 
 3 
issue. The final purpose of this thesis is to propose strategies to effectively 
implement de-escalation training for police officers in the United States. 
This thesis does not attempt to account for all variables in the diverse 
hostile situations experienced by law enforcement officers.  An attempt to do so 
would be complex and impractical. Although it might not be possible to determine 
precise causation of misapplied force, it is possible to identify the basic elements 
of social interactions that are more likely to result in de-escalation rather than 
escalation. It behooves law enforcement practitioners to investigate and propose 
strategies and techniques that are safer for society and the police. Inaction or the 
maintenance of the status quo is unacceptable and contrary to the will of the 
public. 
 This research will not consider psychological causes that could influence 
the misuse of force by police officers. It will not examine possible triggers such as 
post-traumatic stress disorder, or deficient anger management skill sets, nor will 
it investigate therapies to address those issues. Although there has been ample 
research performed in the areas of treating and managing psychological 
disorders, this study will focus on training curricula that apply to all police officers, 
not just those who may be affected by mental health disorders.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
What impact could labels have on police behavior? Are the de-escalation 
techniques of the CIT program effective at reducing the use of force? Do other 
countries have de-escalation strategies that could be applied in the United 
States? What is the current state of de-escalation training in United States law 
enforcement agencies?  
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
It is unknown whether PT has been previously used to analyze the 
interactions of officers and citizens. However, being able to discern how words 
are used to position individuals engaged in discourse might aid the police to 
 4 
better assess contentious situations and provide strategies to peacefully resolve 
them. Additionally, understanding the principles of PT might provide a clearer 
understanding of how the application or assumption of labels influences 
behavior.  
This thesis will examine the prevailing research related to CITs. More 
specifically, it will explore whether CITs have been effective at reducing the use 
of force during police interactions with individuals suffering mental health crises. 
If shown that they are efficacious, a recommendation will be made for all law 
enforcement officers to be taught the techniques. If the techniques are not shown 
to be effective, a recommendation will be made for a critical evaluation of the 
viability of the CIT program.  
Law enforcement agencies in foreign countries have struggled to devise 
safer ways of policing their populations. Some of the methods they have created 
may be applicable and beneficial to police agencies in the United States. This 
thesis will review effective strategies to reduce the use of force developed by the 
United Kingdom and Australia. The desired end result is for a safer environment 
for police officers and the citizens they serve.  
D. OVERVIEW OF THESIS CHAPTERS 
Chapter II contains a review of the literature on PT, CITs, de-escalation—
domestic and foreign—RPD, and theories of human behavior that could impede 
implementing change in law enforcement philosophy and training.  
Chapter III consists of a review of how the warrior mythos may have been 
inculcated into police lore. A discussion of the warrior versus guardian debate 
and how PT could be applied to it will also be provided.  
Chapter IV presents an analysis of force and de-escalation training. The 
results of the PERF survey are compared to the results of a survey conducted for 
this thesis with members of the IADLEST. The surveys’ objectives were to 
determine the minimum number of training hours given to new police recruits in 
 5 
force and de-escalation topics. The methodology and results of the IADLEST 
survey will be presented. An analysis and discussion of the PERF and IADLEST 
surveys’ results will be offered in light of the framework of RPD.  
Chapter V offers recommendations based on the findings of this thesis. It 
will suggest that an understanding of the principles of PT could result in less use 
of force and more peaceful encounters with citizens. It will also include 
recommendations for increasing de-escalation training for police officers based 
on the PERF and IADLEST surveys’ results, which are congruent with the 
principles of RPD. Additionally, it will propose the rejection of some foreign 
methods to reduce the use of force but the adoption of others. Finally, it will 
propose strategies for overcoming opposition to increasing de-escalation training 
for police officers in the United States.  
The discussion in Chapter VI lists areas for further research. It will 
recommend further research into CIT de-escalation principles based on actual 
incidents, utilizing control and experimental groups. It will also be suggested that 
studies be undertaken to determine whether CIT de-escalation techniques are 
effective at reducing the use of force not only with mentally ill patients but with 
the general population as well.   
Chapter VII is the concluding chapter. It will summarize the pertinent 
findings of this thesis and provide an overview of the issues addressed. 
 6 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review will provide an overview of Positioning Theory (PT) 
and how it describes rights and duties individuals assume and ascribe during 
encounters with others.7 PT offers a framework to analyze interactions between 
citizens and the police. Understanding the principles of PT could provide 
concepts that could augment de-escalation techniques.  
Next, the available literature on Crisis Intervention Teams (CITs) will be 
examined. The curriculum taught to CIT officers focuses on how to de-escalate 
encounters with persons suffering mental illness emergencies and divert them 
from jail and into mental health facilities.8 However, its de-escalation techniques 
could be employed by all police officers to de-escalate volatile situations with all 
citizens. This literature review will present contemporary studies on the 
effectiveness of CIT de-escalation techniques to reduce the use of force. 
A section of this literature review will look at police de-escalation 
strategies that have proven to be effective at reducing the use of force. Included 
in this section will be de-escalation strategies from foreign countries. Data and 
anecdotal evidence from domestic as well as foreign police agencies will be 
provided in this section.  
This literature review will also provide background on the Recognition-
Primed Decision (RPD) model of decision-making. Building on the RPD 
background and overview, this thesis will propose that police training on force be 
analyzed through the RPD model. Understanding how rapid decisions are made 
in time-limited and demanding circumstances will support changing the way 
police officers are trained.  
                                            
7 Fathali Moghaddam and Rom Harré, Words of Conflict, Words of War (Santa Barbara, 
California: Praeger, 2010), 2. 
8 Randolph Dupont, Sam Cochran, and Sarah Pillsbury, “Crisis Intervention Team Core 
Elements,” The University of Memphis School of Urban Affairs and Public Policy Department of 
Criminology and Criminal Justice CIT Center (September 2007): 14–15. 
 8 
This literature review will also present theories on human behavior that 
could provide insight to possible resistance some police practitioners might have 
to implementing de-escalation strategies. For change to occur, implementation 
strategies need to be utilized to overcome possible opposition. Theories on 
human behavior need to be understood so that resistance can be countered. 
A. POSITIONING THEORY 
Georgetown University professor of psychology, Dr. Fathali Moghaddam, 
has authored multiple books and publications including several on PT. He 
defines PT as “how people use words (and discourse of all types) to locate 
themselves and others.”9 Words attribute responsibilities and roles to individuals 
interacting with one another.10 They can be used to assert or assign rights—what 
a person is owed by others, and duties—what a person owes to others.11 
Moreover, they can be leveraged to label individuals as part of the in-group or the 
out-group, and can elicit postures and positions that can sway the outcome of 
encounters.12 
University of Wollongong professor G. Zelle credits Georgetown and 
Oxford University professor, Rom Harré, as being one of the initial developers of 
PT.13 In a research paper from 2009, Harré et al. explained that PT has been 
used as a framework to understand conflicts ranging from disputes among 
nations to quarrels between individuals.14 Its concepts have provided a 
framework to peacefully resolve disagreements, but it has also been exploited to 
                                            
9 Fathali Moghaddam and Rom Harré, Words of Conflict, Words of War (Santa Barbara, 




13 G. Zelle, “Exploring the Application of Positioning Theory to the Analysis of Organisational 
Change,” Research Online (2009): 2, http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1614&context=commpapers.  
14 Rom Harré et al., “Recent Advances in Positioning Theory,” Theory & Psychology (2009): 
5–31, http://tap.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/19/1/5. 
9 
engage in or perpetuate conflicts.15 However, most research on PT has focused 
on ways in which it can provide understanding and context of issues to bring 
about peaceful outcomes.16 
PT is distinctive from the Role Theory (RT) framework found in traditional 
social psychology.17 Sociologist B.J. Biddle describes RT as “a theatrical 
metaphor” where individuals conform to particular “parts” and follow a “script” as 
established by society.18 He further explains that the RT framework 
encompasses three elements: “roles,” or set “characteristic behaviors,” “social 
positions,” defined as established “parts to be played,” and “expectations,” which 
are the demarcated “scripts for behavior.”19 While RT’s components are rigid and 
constant, Harré and Moghaddam assert that the elements of PT are “labile, 
contestable and ephemeral.”20 PT’s framework accounts for dynamic, social 
interactions, between individuals, groups, or countries.21 
According to Harré and Moghaddam, the Positioning Theory Triangle 
framework consists of, “storyline(s).” “position(s).” and “Illocutionary force(s).”22 
Harré provides the following definition of a position. “A position in an episode is a 
momentary assumption or ascription of a certain cluster of rights, duties, and 
obligations with respect to what sorts of things a certain person, in that position, 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Rom Harré and Fathali Moghaddam, “15 Positioning Theory and Social Representations,” 
The Cambridge Handbook of Social Representations (2015): 229, http://fathalimoghaddam.com/
wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Social-Representations.pdf.  
18 B. J. Biddle, “Recent Development in Role Theory,” Annual Review of Sociology (1986): 
67–92, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2083195.  
19 Ibid. 
20 Rom Harré and Fathali Moghaddam, “15 Positioning Theory and Social Representations,” 
The Cambridge Handbook of Social Representations (2015): 229, http://fathalimoghaddam.com/
wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Social-Representations.pdf. 
21 Rom Harré et al., “Recent Advances in Positioning Theory,” Theory & Psychology (2009): 
5–31, http://tap.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/19/1/5. 
22 Rom Harré and Fathali Moghaddam, “15 Positioning Theory and Social Representations,” 
The Cambridge Handbook of Social Representations (2015): 229, http://fathalimoghaddam.com/
wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Social-Representations.pdf. 
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can say and do.”23 In a law enforcement context, a police officer has the right to 
apprehend those he has probable cause to believe have committed a crime. 
Furthermore, from the officer’s position, the person alleged to have committed 
the criminal act has a duty to subject himself to arrest. However, the suspected 
criminal in the situation may assign rights and duties to himself and the police 
officer that are contrary to the officer’s position.  
In addition to positions, another component of PT is speech acts, which 
are sometimes referred to as illocutionary forces or simply acts.24 Speech acts 
are words and actions that provide context and meaning to developing 
interactions.25 As background, the term “illocutionary forces” is taken from J. L. 
Austin’s lectures on the usage of words.26 Austin differentiated phrases as 
locutionary, the precise meaning of a phrase; illocutionary, what was implied; and 
perlocutionary, the resulting action.27 For example, a law enforcement officer 
may stop a motor vehicle operator for a violation and ask, “Do you have 
identification?” If the driver interprets the question literally, a correct response 
would be “yes” or “no.” However, the implied force of the officer’s question is for 
the motor vehicle operator to produce identification. If the driver produces a form 
                                            
23 Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton, “ The Discursive Turn in 
Social Psychology by Rom Harré,” The Handbook of Discourse Analysis (Malden, 






24 Nikki Slocum-Bradley, Promoting Conflict or Peace Through Identity (Burlington, Vermont: 
Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008), 106. 
25 G. Zelle, “Exploring the Application of Positioning Theory to the Analysis of Organisational 
Change,” Research Online (2009): 3, http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1614&context=commpapers. 
26 J. L. Austin, “How to do Things With Words,” Oxford at the Clarendon Press (1962), 
accessed June 25, 2016, http://pubman.mpdl.mpg.de/pubman/item/escidoc:2271128:3/
component/escidoc:2271430/austin_1962_how-to-do-things-with-words.pdf.  
27 Ibid., 120. 
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of identification, he would be performing a perlocutionary act. Illocutionary acts 
can be in the form of questions, warnings, orders, and so forth.28 
In addition to speech acts and positions, storylines are the third 
component of PT.29 Storylines are predicated upon local or mutually understood 
social conventions, customs, or ceremonies.30 They shape the perceptions of 
individuals in a dialogue about how the events will likely unfold.31 Participants in 
a police interrogation understand that the detective will ask questions, which the 
person being interrogated may answer. Depending on his answers, charges 
alleging criminal conduct may be filed with the future possibility of prosecution 
and incarceration.  
The three elements of PT—positions, illocutionary forces, and storylines—
make up the three corners of PT’s Positioning Triangle shown in Figure 1.32  
 
    Position(s) 
     
 
 
  Illocutionary Force(s)            Storyline(s) 
Figure 1.  Positioning Triangle.33 
                                            
28 Ibid., 98, 108. 
29 Nikki Slocum-Bradley, Promoting Conflict or Peace Through Identity (Burlington, Vermont: 
Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008), 105. 
30 Jaan Valsiner, The Oxford Handbook of Culture and Psychology (Oxford, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), 198. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Nikki Slocum-Bradley, Promoting Conflict or Peace Through Identity (Burlington, Vermont: 
Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008), 105. 
33 Adapted from Nikos Bozatzis and Thalia Dragonas, “The Discursive Turn in Social 
Psychology,” Taos Institute Publication (2011): 134, http://www.taosinstitute.net/Websites/taos/
images/PublicationsWorldShare/DiscursiveTurn_f_v2.pdf.  
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According to psychologist Dr. Nikki Slocum-Bradley, the Positioning Triangle 
visually demonstrates the interconnectedness of the three elements and how 
they interrelate to one another.34 Authors Bozatizis and Dragonas provide the 
explanation that an individual in an exchange with another person can alter any 
aspect of the Positioning Triangle, which could alter the course of events.35 They 
define positions, and the other elements of PT, as being fluid, disputed, and 
momentary during any interaction, and add that rights and duties asserted and 
projected by one party might be denied and rejected by the other party.36  
To provide a law enforcement example, a police officer may assert a right 
to search a citizen’s vehicle based on probable cause and ascribe to the 
individual the duty to submit to the search. However, the citizen may believe the 
officer’s claim is illegitimate and refuse to comply. In response to the citizen 
attributing a conflicting duty to the officer, the storyline might develop from a 
search, to the arrest of the citizen for obstructing the officer in the performance of 
his duties. If that occurs, the police officer will most likely perform a speech act of 
informing the citizen he is under arrest.  
Slocum-Bradley explains that conflict develops when storylines, positions, 
or illocutionary forces oppose one another.37 While some conflict can be 
productive in effecting positive changes, it becomes destructive when violence 
emerges.38 Recognizing and understanding clashing discursive actions can help 
resolve conflicts and promote peace through the implementation of 
countermanding positions, speech acts, and storylines.39 An example of how 
                                            
34 Nikki Slocum-Bradley, Promoting Conflict or Peace Through Identity (Burlington, Vermont: 
Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008), 107. 
35 Nikos Bozatzis and Thalia Dragonas, “The Discursive Turn in Social Psychology,” Taos 
Institute Publication (2011): 134, http://www.taosinstitute.net/Websites/taos/images/
PublicationsWorldShare/DiscursiveTurn_f_v2.pdf. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Nikki Slocum-Bradley, Promoting Conflict or Peace Through Identity (Burlington, Vermont: 
Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008), 113. 
38 Ibid., 8. 
39 Ibid., 8. 
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discursive strategies have been implemented to resolve conflict is the “town 
versus gown” controversy between the students of Georgetown University and 
the residents of Georgetown.40 Slocum-Bradley relays that one positive 
positioning tactic employed to attenuate the dispute was to position all parties as 
“citizens” with equal rights and duties as opposed to “students” and “residents” 
with differing rights and duties.41  
Ascribing equal rights and duties to groups or individuals involved in a 
conflict is one discursive strategy listed by Slocum-Bradley in her book, 
Promoting Conflict or Peace through Identity.42 Her list of peace promoting 
actions is  
the equal allocation of rights and duties to groups of people; 
identifying people as members of the same group;  
characterizing certain individuals as problematic and the ‘majority’ 
of people as unified and harmonious;  
characterizing certain actions as ‘unintentional’;  
the attribution of benign motivations; and  
characterizing groups as weak when divided but strong when 
unified.43 
On the other end of the spectrum, Slocum-Bradley identifies conflict-fomenting 
practices as  
certain types of speech acts, including accusations, rebukes, 
lambasting, reproaches, belittlement, condemnations, censure, 
reprimanding, blaming and social obloquy;  
the assignment of discrepant rights and duties to different groups 
by allocating rights and duties according to criteria that are met by 
some persons but not others;  
                                            
40 Ibid., 114. 
41 Ibid., 114. 
42 Ibid., 8. 
43 Ibid., 9. 
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assigning stable traits to groups of persons, especially ‘victim’ and 
victimizer identities; and  
undermining the legitimacy of other actors and their actions through 
various discursive techniques, including attributing malign 
intentions.44 
Zelle documents that PT was originally developed in the 1980s during 
research on gender differences.45 Since that time it has been applied to a wide 
range of issues, from marketing merchandise to understanding the dynamics of 
organizational change.46 More recently, Moghaddam and others have used the 
framework of PT to analyze world conflicts.47 One example offered by Dufour, 
Goldberg, and Moghaddam is the interactions of the United States and al-
Qaeda.48 In the early 1980s the United States supported and advised groups 
that eventually came to form al-Qaeda in their fight against the Soviet Union.49 
Some estimate that besides training what became al-Qaeda’s fighters, the United 
States provided funding of approximately $20 billion to these forces in their fight 
against the Soviets.50 President Reagan referred to them as “freedom fighters.”51 
After the war with the Soviets ended, and the Soviet Union dissolved, the United 
States focused on other foreign policy interests.52 The position ascribed to al-
Qaeda by the United States changed after September 11, 2001, when President 
                                            
44 Ibid. 
45 G. Zelle, “Exploring the Application of Positioning Theory to the Analysis of Organisational 
Change,” Research Online (2009): 2, http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1614&context=commpapers. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Daniel J. Dufour, Rachel Goldberg, and Fathali M. Moghaddam, “The Enemy of My Enemy 
is My Friend,” The Psychology of Friendship and Enmity: Relationships in Love, Work, Politics, 
and War, 41–43, http://fathalimoghaddam.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/The-Enemy-of-My-
Enemy-is-My-Friend.pdf.  
48 Ibid., 41. 
49 Ibid., 41. 
50 Ibid., 41. 
51 Ibid., 42. 
52 Ibid., 42. 
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George W. Bush declared al-Qaeda as “enemies of freedom.”53 The rights and 
duties assumed by the United States towards al-Qaeda changed from friend to 
foe. 
Harré et al. summarized how PT is applied to conflicts as follows, 
“Positioning theory focuses on bringing to light the normative frames within which 
people actually carry on their lives, thinking, feeling, acting, and perceiving—
against standards of correctness.”54 He asserts that altering a person’s position 
can change how that person acts and is perceived by others.55 He concludes 
that having a diverse set of communicative skills to react to positions imposed by 
others can help alleviate a situation from collapsing into conflict.56  
According to Zaiser and Staller, de-escalation is founded on 
communication skills.57 Learning, understanding, and applying the principles of 
PT could enhance communication techniques taught in de-escalation courses. It 
could also lead to a reduction of the use of force by police officers. 
B. CRISIS INTERVENTION TEAMS 
In the late summer of 1987, Memphis (Tennessee) police officers were 
called to a residence where an individual suffering from a mental health disorder 
was harming himself with a knife.58 Upon arrival, the police found that no one’s 
safety was in jeopardy other than the unstable individual who was cutting 
                                            
53 Ibid., 42. 




57 Benjamin Zaiser and Mario S. Staller, “The Word is Sometimes Mightier Than the Sword: 




58 Betsy Vickers, “Memphis, Tennessee, Police Department’s Crisis Intervention Team,” U.S. 
Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs Bureau of Justice Assistance (July 2000): 4, 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/182501.pdf.  
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himself.59 The officers ordered the individual to drop the knife, he lunged at them 
and they responded by discharging their firearms, which resulted in his death.60 
In answer to the public’s outrage over the incident, the mayor of Memphis 
commissioned a task force to develop a method for safely dealing with 
individuals experiencing mental health crises.61 The task force was composed of 
mental health workers, law enforcement practitioners, and general community 
members.62 The CIT model was developed as a safe and effective method to 
deal with persons suffering from mental health emergencies.63  
Since their conception, CITs have proliferated in many communities 
throughout the United States.64 The CIT model is a diversionary program that 
emphasizes the placement of individuals who are having mental illness 
emergencies into mental health care rather than into jail.65 Under the Memphis 
CIT model, police officers volunteer to receive 40 hours of training in CIT 
principles, which include an overview of mental health illnesses, mental health 
care, and de-escalation techniques.66 The Memphis CIT training schedule is 
illustrated in Figure 2. 





63 Michael T. Compton et al., “A Comprehensive Review of Extant Research on Crisis 
Intervention Team (CIT) Programs,” The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the 
Law 1 (November 2008): 47, http://www.jaapl.org/content/36/1/47.full.pdf+html. 
64 Megan L. Davidson, “A Criminal Justice System-Wide Response to Mental Illness: 
Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Memphis Crisis Intervention Team Training Curriculum 
Among Law Enforcement and Correctional Officers,” Criminal Justice Policy Review (2016): 47, 
doi: 10.1177/0887403414554997. 
65 Michael T. Compton et al., “A Comprehensive Review of Extant Research on Crisis 
Intervention Team (CIT) Programs,” The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the 
Law 1 (November 2008): 47, http://www.jaapl.org/content/36/1/47.full.pdf+html. 
66 Melissa S. Morabito et al., “Crisis Intervention Teams and People with Mental Illness: 




Figure 2.  Memphis Model Training Schedule.67 
                                            
67 Source: “National Curriculum,” University of Memphis CIT Center: A Resource for CIT 
Programs Across the Nation, accessed July 10, 2016, http://cit.memphis.edu/
curriculuma.php?id=0. 
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Police officers who complete the CIT course are designated to be part of 
the police response to calls involving individuals with mental illnesses.68 CIT 
certified police officers are considered part of the mental health providers’ 
community that delivers services to individuals and families suffering from mental 
health crises.69 The Memphis CIT model’s guidelines include a recommendation 
that police dispatchers receive a version of CIT training to learn how to recognize 
and elicit information from citizens requesting police assistance with mental 
health emergencies.70 Additionally, mental health providers are encouraged to 
participate in “ride along” opportunities with the police to gain insight into the 
difficulties officers face when dealing with consumers of mental health services.71 
The Memphis CIT program’s procedures urge that policies be established to 
direct the police and mental health providers on the program’s objectives.72 In 
her doctoral dissertation, Cindy Stewart claimed the overall “objectives of the 
Memphis Model are to help officers recognize symptoms of mental illness, 
increase their use of mental health alternatives to arrest, and promote the 
physical safety of both officers and mentally ill citizens during police 
interactions.”73 
Law enforcement and mental health practitioners commonly accept the 
CIT model as an effective strategy to minimize force during police encounters 
involving individuals experiencing mental health emergencies. CITs have lofty 
                                            
68 Melissa S. Morabito et al., “Crisis Intervention Teams and People with Mental Illness: 
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69 Ibid. 
70 Randolph Dupont, Sam Cochran, and Sarah Pillbury, “Crisis Intervention Team Core 
Elements,” The University of Memphis School of Urban Affairs and Public Policy Department of 
Criminology and Criminal Justice CIT Center (September 2007): 12, http://cit.memphis.edu/pdf/
CoreElements.pdf. 
71 Ibid., 14. 
72 Ibid., 10. 
73 Cindy Stewart, “Police Intervention in Mental Health Crisis: A Case Study of the 




goals of increased safety for officers and patients, enhanced empathy and 
understanding for mental illness, and more efficient avenues to deliver critical 
services to those in distress. Research has been conducted to ascertain whether 
CITs have achieved their designed purposes. This literature review will focus on 
the research that has been conducted pertaining to the CIT’s objective of 
reducing the use of force through de-escalation. 
In 2009, Compton et al. used surveys to study the effectiveness of CITs.74 
The officers’ completing the surveys gave their assumptions of actions they 
would take based on facts provided to them in a series of three hypothetical 
scenarios.75 Some of the officers taking the surveys had received training in CIT 
and some had not.76 After compiling the data, researchers found that both 
groups surmised that they would increase their use of force across the three 
scenarios.77 However, the CIT trained officers chose actions of less force than 
non-CIT trained officers when dealing with the hypothetical psychotic individual in 
the third scenario.78  
Compton et al. held that officers trained in CIT principles were more 
confident than their counterparts that de-escalation techniques would resolve 
situations.79 Although this study only considered hypothetical scenarios, 
researchers concluded that CIT training would attenuate the incidents of force 
perpetrated by police officers interacting with mentally ill subjects.80 Compton et 
al. asserted, “Through the CIT curriculum, officers develop a deeper 
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understanding of their own ability to positively impact the behavior of a person in 
crisis, moving toward de-escalation and away from use of force.”81  
Compton et al.’s conclusions marginally support the premise that CIT de-
escalation training is effective in reducing the use of force by police officers.82 
However, the conclusions of the research were based on the officers’ beliefs of 
what actions they would have most likely taken based on the information 
provided in the vignettes.83 The conclusions were not founded upon actual 
actions taken in real-world incidents, which limited the significance of Compton et 
al.’s results. 
Out of all the studies reviewed during the research for this thesis, only one 
compared actual real-world incidents handled by CIT trained officers and non-
CIT trained officers.84 The study, conducted in 2012 by Morabito et al., compared 
the number of instances where force was used by CIT trained Chicago (Illinois) 
police officers versus those who had not received CIT training.85 The results of 
the study supported the premise that CIT trained officers used force significantly 
less often than non-CIT trained officers as the mental health patients’ resistance 
increased.86 However, Morabito et al. found surprising evidence that when CIT 
trained officers used force, they used “higher levels of force” than non-CIT 
trained officers.87  




84 Melissa S. Morabito et al., “Crisis Intervention Teams and People with Mental Illness: 
Exploring the Factors That Influence the Use of Force,” Crime & Delinquency (January 2012): 
57–77, http://cad.sagepub.com/content/58/1/57.full.pdf+html. 
85 Ibid., 62. 
86 Ibid., 70. 
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 In 2010, researchers Oliva, Morgan, and Compton found that police 
officers intuitively use de-escalation methods in many situations.88 Nevertheless, 
the researchers posited that learning the de-escalation skills taught in the CIT 
curriculum could enhance police officers’ instinctive abilities to proficiently and 
safely handle individuals in any type of situation.89 While Oliva, Morgan, and 
Compton’s conclusions are promising that CIT de-escalation techniques could be 
a solution to reduce the use of force, a study undertaken in 2014 by researcher 
Sema A. Taheri resulted in a different conclusion. Taheri’s study attempted to 
ascertain whether evidence existed to justify the continuation of CITs.90 Her 
investigation was based on an assessment made by J. L. Geller who retorted, 
“Although no one could be against encouraging this [CIT] education for officers, 
without more evidence of its effectiveness, it remains simply a blindly adopted 
novelty.”91 Taheri researched publicly available automated records that 
contained data about CITs and CIT related research.92 Her study concluded that 
CIT training had no influence on the amount of force police officers used on 
individuals suffering mental health emergencies.93  
C. DE-ESCALATION 
Academic studies focused on police de-escalation are predominantly 
associated with CIT. While there are several articles in media outlets and 
periodicals addressing de-escalation for police, this literature review found no 
scholarly studies focused on police de-escalation that did not mention the CIT 
model. Moreover, this literature review uncovered only two academic papers 
                                            88 Janet R. Oliva, Rhiannon Morgan, and Michael T. Compton, “A Practical Overview of De-
Escalation Skills in Law Enforcement: Helping Individuals in Crisis While Reducing Police Liability 
and Injury,” Journal of Police Crisis Negotiations (2010): 18. doi: 10.1080/15332581003785421 
89 Ibid.,15. 
90 Sema A. Taheri, “Do Crisis Intervention Teams Reduce Arrests and Improve Officer 
Safety? A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis,” Criminal Justice Policy Review (November 5, 
2014): 79, doi: 10.1177/0887403414556289.  
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid., 80–81. 
93 Ibid., 86, 90. 
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addressing general police de-escalation and both included CIT principles in the 
discussion. One of the academic papers on police de-escalation, authored by 
Oliva, Morgan, and Compton, was referenced in the previous section. Former law 
enforcement officer Benjamin Zaiser and Dr. Mario Staller, an instructor of police 
force and firearms, conducted the other study found on police de-escalation.94  
Zaiser and Staller’s prescriptive research contained a list of 
communication skills recommended for de-escalation similar to the list in Oliva, 
Morgan, and Compton’s research.95 Unlike Oliva, Morgan, and Compton’s study, 
Zaiser and Staller included an adjustment of how police officers should perceive 
and respond to citizens, similar to concepts of PT.96 They asserted that police 
officers should consider the people they encounter as equal citizens rather than 
antagonists.97 They constructed a simple flowchart, shown in Figure 3, to 
illustrate their assertions.98  
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Figure 3.  Flowchart of Police Officer Perception and Actions.99 
Criminal Justice professor Dr. Megan L. Davidson claims that statistics 
show individuals suffering from mental illnesses are involved in approximately 
seven to 10% of all police calls for service.100 Morabito et al. affirmed that in all 
situations—inclusive of individuals who are and are not suffering from mental 
illness—police use force less than 1% of the time.101 Moreover, minor scrapes 
and contusions are the typical injuries sustained from use of force incidents 
involving the general population.102 However, the importance of providing police 
officers with effective de-escalation techniques and strategies cannot be 
understated.  
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The studies documented in the previous section of this chapter suggest 
that CIT is not substantially effective at reducing the incidence of force. However, 
a few police agencies have observed reductions in the use of force and better 
outcomes through an increase in de-escalation training. One such agency is the 
Richmond (California) Police Department.  
In a 2014 news article in the Contra Costa Times, reporters Rogers and 
DeBolt alleged that the Richmond police had not killed anyone for seven 
years.103 The reason, they maintained, is because of training focused on 
reducing force and the use of less lethal weapons by Richmond officers.104 
According to Rogers and DeBolt, the Richmond Police Department implemented 
quarterly scenario-based training in 2008 that presented officers with de-
escalation and force options.105 From that time until 2014, Richmond police had 
less than one officer involved shooting per year, and no fatalities resulted from 
any of the shootings.106 Conversely, from 2006–2007 Richmond police shot five 
people, including one that was mortally wounded.107 It also vastly contrasts to 
the statistics of other police agencies near Richmond. For instance, Richmond 
lies within Contra Costa County. Between 2008 and 2013, Contra Costa County 
Sheriff’s Deputies shot fifteen people, nine of them fatally.108 
While the quarterly scenario-based training sessions are seen as part of 
Richmond’s success in reducing the use of force, there are other elements 
involved in achieving the results they have realized. Richmond Police instructor 
Lieutenant Louie Tirona asserted that their success “includes the rigor of training, 
the emphasis on communication with armed suspects, the thorough review of all 
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force used and the philosophy that force must only be a last resort.”109 In 
addition to Richmond’s significant accomplishments at reducing the use of force, 
it is also remarkable that no Richmond police officers were shot during the 2008 
to 2014 timeframe.110 
Dallas (Texas) Police Department has also claimed less force being used 
by their officers following de-escalation training.111 In an article in The Dallas 
Morning News, Naomi Martin reported that in 2009, 147 complaints for excessive 
force were filed against Dallas police officers.112 Following de-escalation training, 
only 13 such complaints had been levied against Dallas officers during the first 
11 months of 2015.113 However, a criminal justice professor interviewed for the 
article was cautious about connecting the drop in complaints to the de-escalation 
training without additional research.114  
D. DE-ESCALATION IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES 
In addition to police agencies in the United States being confronted with 
calls for implementing de-escalation programs to reduce the use of force, foreign 
police agencies have faced similar situations. One country that United States law 
enforcers have looked to for ways to reduce the incidents of force is the United 
Kingdom. The two countries share a common history and a close relationship. 
Like the United States, police officers across the pond have experienced 
allegations of excessive force. In May of 2015, it was reported that 3,000 British 
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police officers were under investigation for police brutality.115 Nevertheless, most 
police officers in the United Kingdom enjoy an overall positive image with their 
citizens.116  
Unlike police in the United States, police in the United Kingdom 
experience fewer line of duty deaths. Four of the more than 160,000 police 
officers in the United Kingdom lost their lives in the line of duty in 2015.117 Out of 
the approximate 885,000 law enforcement officers working in the United States, 
133 were killed in the line of duty in the same year.118 Based on the 2015 
statistics, one out of every 40,000 police officers in the United Kingdom was 
killed in the line of duty. In the United States, one out of every 6,654 law 
enforcement officers was killed in the line of duty, which translates into policing in 
the United States being six times more dangerous than policing in the United 
Kingdom. 
In 2015, a group of law enforcement executives from the United States 
visited Scotland in an attempt to ascertain how police in the United Kingdom 
work in relative security while routinely being unarmed.119 The United States 
officials found that police in Scotland use verbal de-escalation methods to calm 
volatile situations.120 Additionally, they were told that Scottish police are not 
ashamed to retreat—or “tactically withdraw” as it was referred to—when it is 
appropriate.121 They also learned that the last time a police officer in Scotland 
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had been killed in the line of duty during a violent confrontation with a criminal 
was in 1994.122  
One member of the United States delegation to Scotland was Chuck 
Wexler, the executive director of the Police Executive Research Forum 
(PERF).123 After Wexler’s visit to Scotland, PERF published 30 “Guiding 
Principles” on how police officers in the United States could use less force while 
working in their communities.124 The 5th and 15th Guiding Principles contained 
the recommendation that all police departments in the United States adopt the 
Critical Decision-Making Model (CDMM), which was fashioned after the United 
Kingdom’s National Decision Model or NDM.125 The fourth standard of the 10 
Standards of Professional Behavior that form the basis of the NDM is, “I will only 
use force as part of my role and responsibilities, and only to the extent that it is 
necessary, proportionate and reasonable in all the circumstances.”126 Charts of 
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Figure 4.  PERF’s Critical Decision-Making Model.127  
                                            
127 Source: “Guiding Principles on Use of Force,” Police Executive Research Forum, January 
29, 2016, 27, http://www.policeforum.org/assets/30%20guiding%20principles.pdf.  
 29 
 
Figure 5.  United Kingdom’s National Decision Model.128  
The NDM was introduced to the United Kingdom’s law enforcement 
officers in 2012.129 It was developed from the Conflict Management Model, which 
was primarily a risk assessment tool.130 The NDM was created at the urging of 
United Kingdom’s Association of Chief Police Officers who wanted a decision-
making framework that could be utilized in a variety of situations.131 Since its 
introduction, the NDM has been accepted as the national standard to be used by 
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all police officers in all situations.132 Although the NDM appears to be a valid 
system for decision-making, it is a complicated model that might not be 
efficacious in the rapidly evolving, dangerous incidents faced by law enforcement 
officers in the United States.  
A major difference between the United States and the United Kingdom 
that has a profound influence on the choice of a decision-making framework is 
the elevated threat level from the proliferation of firearms in the United States. 
Handguns are banned in the United Kingdom and owners of rifles and shotguns 
must be licensed and prove a legitimate need to possess long guns.133 Because 
there are significantly fewer guns available in the United Kingdom and ownership 
is strictly regulated, the most common weapon used against police officers is a 
knife.134 It is reasonable to conclude that since knives are the primary weapons 
used by assailants in the United Kingdom, police have more time to use a 
complex decision-making framework like the NDM. On the other hand, law 
enforcers in the United States are faced with the fast and sudden threat of gun 
violence and would most likely be better served by following the philosophy of the 
RPD model of decision making discussed in Section E of this literature review.  
Much like police in the United Kingdom, Australian police share a common 
background and philosophy with police in the United States. And, like the police 
in the United States, Australia’s police officers have struggled with allegations of 
police brutality and excessive use of force.135 The de-escalation efforts of the 
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Tasmania and Victoria police agencies are discussed in the following 
paragraphs.   
1. Tasmania 
Tasmania is an island state of the Commonwealth of Australia that is 
located off of the southeast corner of the main continent of Australia. Tasmanian 
police experienced an increase in use of force complaints that started in the mid-
1990s and peaked around the turn of the century.136 Over the next nine years, 
from 2000 to 2009, complaints of excessive use of force and assaults 
perpetrated by the police gradually declined from an average of 17 complaints 
per 100 officers to six complaints per 100 officers.137 
In analyzing the decline in citizen complaints, researchers Prenzler, 
Porter, and Alpert investigated plausible explanations to account for the drop in 
allegations against the police.138 One theory they considered was the possible 
refusal by the Tasmanian police to accept or formally document complaints.139 
However, this hypothesis was invalidated because Tasmania has an 
independent Ombudsman who also receives citizen complaints against the 
police.140 The Tasmania’s Office of the Ombudsman experienced a parallel 
decline in complaints against the police during the same nine-year period the 
police department had a drop in complaints.141 Prenzler, Porter, and Alpert also 
speculated that complaints might have decreased due to a work reduction by the 
Tasmanian police.142 However, they found an increase in enforcement output by 
the Tasmanian police during the nine-year span of the study.143  
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The probe into the most likely reasons for the decrease in citizen 
complaints led Prenzler, Porter, and Alpert to two primary factors that could 
account for the decline.144 One plausible cause was the use of a “Job Suitability 
Test” to disqualify police candidates with undesirable characteristics.145 The 
Tasmania Police recruitment literature does not describe what qualities the Job 
Suitability Test evaluates. Nevertheless, the Tasmania Police website lists five 
aspects of a candidate’s character examined by the suitability test: “problem 
solving ability, personality, opinions about society, work place procedures.” and 
“your personal history and opinion.”146  
The other factor that Prenzler, Porter, and Alpert concluded likely 
influenced the drop in citizen complaints was a substantial change in police 
training with a primary focus on de-escalation.147 The Tasmanian training 
curriculum moved from a condensed defensive tactics course to a program 
taught over an extended period of time.148 The new course emphasized de-
escalation, communication and negotiation proficiencies, and included role-
playing exercises and scenarios.149 Researchers believe that these two 
changes—testing for job suitable characteristics and a significant revamping of 
the training regimen for recruits—likely accounted for the drop in citizen 
complaints.150  
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2. Victoria 
Like police in the United States, Victoria (Australia) police officers routinely 
carry firearms.151 Nevertheless, police in the Australian state of Victoria rarely 
shoot and kill citizens during the course of their duties.152 From 1980 to 2005, 
Victoria police officers shot and killed an average of approximately two people 
per year.153 However, in 1994, there were nine citizens killed by the Victorian 
police.154 The surge in deaths led to public outcry and demands for dramatic 
changes to the manner in which the police officers in Victoria used force.155 The 
graph in Figure 6 shows the number of individuals killed by Victorian police 
between the years of 1980 and 2005.156  
 
 
Figure 6.  Number of Police Perpetrated Deaths in Victoria, Australia.157 
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Faced with public outrage and a spike in deaths at the hands of the police, 
the Victoria Police instituted an overhaul to their use of force policy and 
procedures.158 The overhaul was introduced in 1995 and was called Project 
Beacon.159 When it was implemented, Project Beacon was based on 10 
Operational Safety Principles rather than a use of force continuum.160 The 
Operation Safety Principles, listed below, are still followed by Victoria’s police 
officers today.161  
1. Safety first — the safety of police, the public and offenders or 
suspects is paramount. 
2. Risk assessment — is to be applied to all incidents and 
operations. 
3. Take charge — exercise effective command and control. 
4. Planned response—take every opportunity to convert an 
unplanned response into a planned operation. 
5. Cordon and containment — unless impractical, adopt a ‘cordon 
and containment’ approach. 
6. Avoid confrontation — a violent confrontation is to be avoided. 
7. Avoid force — the use of force is to be avoided. 
8. Minimum force — where use of force cannot be avoided, only 
use the minimum amount reasonably necessary. 
9. Forced entry searches — are to be used only as a last resort. 
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10. Resources — it is accepted that the ‘safety first’ principle may 
require the deployment of more resources, more complex planning 
and more time to complete.162 
In addition to the 10 Operational Safety Principles, Project Beacon 
integrated scenario-based training in recruit and in-service training sessions.163 
Prenzler, Porter, and Alpert found that the training sessions included the 
acquisition of skills in “communication and conflict resolution” along with firearms 
proficiency and defensive tactics.164 As illustrated in Figure 6, the rate of deaths 
caused by the police in Victoria significantly decreased after Project Beacon was 
implemented.165 At first glance, the principles of Project Beacon appear to hold 
potential for reducing police applied force in the United States. While that may be 
true, the Victoria Police experienced a slight resurgence of citizen deaths at the 
hands of the police beginning in 2003.166 After analyzing the increase in deaths, 
the Victoria Office of Police Integrity concluded, 
It appears that Victoria Police has lost some of the strategic focus 
on safety and avoiding the use of force [sic] which it developed 
during Project Beacon… The result is a lack of effective risk 
management, a culture in which self-assessment, review and 
improvement are given insufficient attention, and a diminution of 
essential police training.167 
Should police agencies in the United States adopt a strategy of de-escalation 
similar to Victoria’s Project Beacon, leaders must remember to continually 
emphasize and train on the new strategy and techniques to keep them current in 
the minds of their officers. 
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E. RECOGNITION-PRIMED DECISION 
Police officers are occasionally faced with rapidly developing, volatile 
situations that require quick decisions and decisive action. As was discussed in 
the previous section, complex decision-making models are not beneficial to 
officers in the United States due to the proliferation of firearms. Law enforcement 
practitioners need a framework that explains how potentially momentous 
decisions are made when time is short. That framework is found in the 
Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model introduced by Dr. Gary Klein.168  
 Klein was a former research psychologist for the United States Air Force 
who theorized that individuals in rapidly evolving environments make decisions 
based on prior experiences that match or closely match the elements of the 
situation at hand.169 The individual making the decision assesses the 
circumstances and plausible outcomes, and selects a course of action that has 
proven successful in the past.170 Klein posits that the RPD model is a 
“recognitional” rather than an “analytical” decision-making process, meaning 
decisions are based on past experiences rather than on a comprehensive 
analysis of available future-oriented options.171 He acknowledges that RPD does 
not produce an optimal decision, but argues that optimal decisions are 
unattainable in time-limited and stressful circumstances.172 
 Klein’s initial investigation of RPD involved studying the way fire 
commanders made decisions during firefighting operations.173 Since then, the 
United States Army has explored adopting it as a decision-making model for field 
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commanders.174 Lieutenant Colonel David A. Bushey and Major Michael J. 
Forsyth claim that the Global War on Terrorism has necessitated a change from 
the Army’s slow, methodical seven-step Military Decision Making Process 
(MDMP).175 They assert the MDMP relegates the creation of options to 
inexperienced military aides instead of directly involving veteran commanders in 
the decision-making process.176 As an alternative to the MDMP, Bushey and 
Forsyth recommend the adoption of a four-step decision-making model based on 
RPD.177  
In another article on the substitution of RPD for MDMP in military 
applications, Dr. Karol G. Ross et al. addressed one argument against 
implementing RPD as a military decision-making model.178 The rationale against 
adopting RPD was based on the reasoning that field commanders with little 
background or experience might not be able to intuitively arrive at the best 
course of action in an unfamiliar situation.179 Arguing the point, Ross et al. 
countered that the same was true under the MDMP model.180 They contended 
that having multiple solutions generated by inexperienced military aides using the 
MDMP model were no more productive than having one course of action 
produced through the RPD model.181 Moreover, Ross et al. pointed out that the 
RPD model is more flexible and responsive when course corrections are 
needed.182 
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United States Naval Air Warfare researchers Johnston, Driskell, and Salas 
found evidence to support the premise that RPD is an effective decision-making 
process in time limited, stressful circumstances.183 Johnston, Driskell, and Salas 
studied subjects who utilized either a “hypervigilant” (more instinctive) or a 
“vigilant” (more analytical) decision-making style in unpredictable, time-restricted 
situations.184 Their research supported their hypothesis that “a hypervigilant 
decision-making strategy was more effective than a vigilant strategy on a 
naturalistic task under both normal- and high-stress conditions.”185 
Klein’s work on RPD has not only been applied to military operations, but 
has also been incorporated in National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) research on artificial intelligence.186 NASA researcher William Gevarter 
used RPD as a framework to study how computers and humans could 
symbiotically interact during space exploration.187 He believed RPD most 
accurately depicted the process in which humans make decisions, especially 
during stressful situations.188 Based on that belief, he used it as his model for 
studying the possibilities of maximizing human and computer interactions.189  
John R. Patton, Associate Professor of Management at Florida Institute of 
Technology concluded that training enhances spontaneous actions.190 Patton 
wrote that repetitive training produces reactions that become automatic, and 
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appear to be intuitive.191 He contends that prior experiences, which individuals 
can draw upon when making decisions, could be based on actual occurrences or 
simulated scenarios obtained through training.192 This conclusion points to the 
importance of scenario-based training in acquiring an experience base to rely on 
when making decisions during future incidents. 
Klein believed that RPD should not be taught per se, rather it provides 
understanding to how decisions are made.193 He asserted that training is critical 
in helping individuals recognize patterns so that proper decisions can be 
made.194 He stressed, “The part of intuition that involves pattern matching and 
recognition of familiar and typical cases can be trained. If you want people to size 
up situations quickly and accurately, you need to expand their experience 
base.”195  
The National Fire Academy and the Marine Corps Combat Development 
Command have modified their training regimens to include pattern recognition 
drills to develop rapid decision-making skills.196 Police agencies should do the 
same. The content and focus of training is vitally important. When faced with 
sudden and unexpected choices, individuals tend to depend on those 
competencies that are most familiar. Based on the RPD model, it is logical to 
conclude that police officers will respond to stimuli in accordance with their 
training. If a majority of the officer’s training was focused on tactics of force, the 
officer will naturally gravitate to force as the solution. Police training should 
emphasize scenario-based training that provides officers with expanded 
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experiences and pattern recognition in de-escalation to draw upon when urgent 
decisions are needed in real-world situations. 
F. HUMAN BEHAVIOR THEORIES THAT COULD IMPEDE THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF DE-ESCALATION PROGRAMS 
In some exceptional instances, police agencies have made progress 
toward alternative approaches to policing that are less harmful to the public.197 
However, other police practitioners are opposed to changing their policies, 
procedures, or tactics.198 Law enforcement’s resistance to change can be 
analyzed through different theories of human behavior. One such model is the 
Selectorate Theory.199 
 New York University professors Dr. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Dr. 
Alastair Smith crafted the Selectorate Theory, which posits that after achieving 
power, a leader’s only focus is on retaining power.200 Bueno de Mesquita and 
Smith opine that leaders rely on two groups of devotees to acquire and maintain 
power, the “essentials” and the “influentials.”201 This coalition of supporters 
receives tangible rewards from the leader in order for him to remain in power.202 
Bueno de Mesquita and Smith theorize that the masses or the “nominal 
selectorate” are of little concern to the leader since they neither brought him into 
power nor have much impact on whether he stays in power.203 
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Looking at law enforcement through the lens of Selectorate Theory would 
identify the police chief as the leader. Staff members, union members, and police 
officers would make up the ranks of the leader’s inner circles of supporters, and 
the public would be the nominal selectorate. If the leader’s inner circles of 
supporters oppose change, the leader will be less likely to implement change 
since they are keeping him in power. Thus, if the police officers believed de-
escalation techniques are either less effective, or ineffective and could result in a 
greater chance of the police officers being physically harmed, they would oppose 
implementing de-escalation training.  
The “status quo bias” is another theory of human behavior that could be 
used to analyze law enforcement’s resistance to adopting de-escalation 
techniques. According to scholars Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, the 
status quo bias suggests that people tend to stay with what they are familiar with 
rather than change, even when changing could improve their situation.204 Police 
officers might be opposed to learning or using de-escalation techniques because 
they want to stay with what they know and are accustomed to. They might not 
perceive any need to change. In addition to the status quo bias, individuals might 
resist altering their behavior if their current actions are perceived as the norm or 
the preferred method of behavior.205 Thaler and Sunstein contend that groups 
will continue with a certain strategy or “tradition.” even if the tradition is based on 
the view of a single person.206 
A law enforcement example of a belief based on the opinion of one person 
is the commonly held safety standard of the 21-foot rule. The 21-foot rule was the 
result of a single study by a police officer in Salt Lake City, Utah in 1983.207 The 
                                            
204 Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, 
Wealth, and Happiness (Penguin Publishing Group, February 24, 2009), Kindle edition, 7–8. 
205 Ibid., 85. 
206 Ibid., 58–59. 
207 Jaeah Lee, “The Controversial ‘Rule’ Police Rely on to Shoot and Kill Supsects [sic],” 
Mother Jones, December 14, 2015, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/12/police-
shootings-laquan-mcdonald-mario-woods-knives-21-foot-rule. 
 42 
officer calculated that an assailant with a knife could cover 21 feet in the amount 
of time it took for a police officer to remove his firearm from his holster, obtain 
target acquisition, and fire.208 The study was never duplicated nor verified, but it 
has become one of the canons of safety for police in the United States.209 It is 
believed by some people to have been misapplied and misinterpreted by some 
officers to justify shooting subjects armed with knives.210  
One method to motivate police agencies and their officers to adopt de-
escalation strategies could be to offer rewards such as money. Giving money to 
police agencies in the form of grants has been one of the most effective ways 
substantial changes have been made in the past. For example, the U.S. 
Department of Justice implemented nationwide community oriented policing 
programs through grants.211 Offering grants in the form of overtime wages to 
police officers who participate in de-escalation training could cause a shift 
towards de-escalation. Moreover, monetary incentives could be given to police 
agencies that reduce use of force incidents, similar to how insurance companies 
offer discounts to members who participate in preventative measures.  
Besides rewarding police officers and their agencies for compliance with 
established standards, punitive measures could be levied on police agencies to 
hold them accountable for noncompliance. Lawsuits have been one punitive 
method that has effected change in police procedures in the past and will most 
likely do so in the future. For lawsuits to effect lasting and universal change, case 
law needs to be established by decisions handed down by the United States 
Supreme Court. While this method is powerful, it often takes several years for 
cases to wind through the appellate process. For example, the landmark U.S. 
Supreme Court case of Tennessee v. Garner took over 10 years to make its way 
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through the judicial process before a decision was rendered.212 This momentous 
ruling struck down the policies and statutes that allowed for the shooting of 
unarmed, fleeing felons.213  
Another agent for change is to make technology and information easily 
accessible.214 Requiring police agencies to submit statistical data on use of force 
incidents and then publishing that data to the masses could lead to greater 
awareness and accountability. As Louis Brandeis, a former Justice on the 
Supreme Court wrote, “Sunlight is the best of disinfectants.”215 Shedding light on 
the policies and actions of the police might help facilitate change. Moreover, 
changes can be made through setting desired outcomes, informing others of 
results, and making individuals accountable for their performance.216 
Compelling police agencies to submit data to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigations’ Uniform Crime Report (UCR) is one way more accountability 
could be realized. Currently, the UCR lacks validity because the data provided by 
police agencies is voluntarily submitted.217 This results in the UCR not being a 
true representation of policing in the United States. Police agencies should be 
mandated either through federal or local laws to provide an accurate accounting 
of their activities to the UCR.  
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One of the most powerful ways to effect change is through peer 
influence.218 The profound influence of social pressure was well documented in a 
series of experiments performed in the 1950s by Solomon E. Asch, a professor 
of psychology at Swarthmore College.219 Asch found that subjects confronted by 
peer pressure would agree with incorrect answers over 36% of the time during 
simple comparison exercises.220 As in any other group, peer pressure can 
encourage police officers to conform to the norms of the group. The difficulty 
might be getting the group to establish desirable norms. Creating positive 
perceptions of preferred norms could be accomplished through disseminating 
information about agencies that have achieved success through implementing 
de-escalation strategies. The Richmond Police Department is one such agency 
that could be highlighted for its impressive reduction in the use of force by its 
police officers.221  
As has been demonstrated by the different theories of human behavior, 
change is challenging to achieve. Implementing substantive changes in the way 
police officers use force is critical in maintaining harmony between law 
enforcement and the public. More importantly, it is critical in preserving the safety 
of the police and of their fellow citizens.  
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III. APPLYING POSITIONING THEORY TO THE WARRIOR 
VERSUS GUARDIAN DEBATE 
Beginning in 2014, a national conversation erupted over the 
appropriateness of the force being used by police officers.222 Part of the 
discussion revolved around the use of two words describing the police, warriors 
and guardians.223 The topic of which label to apply to law enforcement was even 
included in two of the six pillars of the Final Report of the President’s Task Force 
on 21st Century Policing.224  
One side of the warrior versus guardian dispute argues that officers face 
countless dangers to protect society.225 To protect themselves, they must have a 
warrior mindset and be cautious, careful, and wary.226 They enter battle 
everyday against those who would do harm to them and others.227 To survive, 
they must think like warriors.228 
The other side of the deliberation contends that police officers are not 
engaging in battle.229 Rather, they are serving fellow citizens.230 Moreover, these 
individuals believe that the warrior archetype builds barriers between the police 
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and the public that thwart community policing efforts.231 Less interaction with the 
public hampers public safety and crime-solving efforts due to fewer clues, leads, 
and information being supplied by citizens.232 While some may view the warrior 
versus guardian dispute as mere semantics that have little or no effect on 
behavior, this chapter will explore the impact words have on human interactions. 
The Positioning Theory (PT) framework will be used to analyze the warrior 
versus guardian debate. 
A. THE WARRIOR PERSONA 
It may be challenging to pinpoint how or when the warrior persona began 
to be venerated among law enforcement practitioners. However, a possible point 
of genesis is a book first released in 2004 authored by retired Army Lieutenant 
Colonel Dave Grossman and his co-author Lorin W. Christensen entitled On 
Combat: The Psychology and Physiology of Deadly Conflict in War and 
Peace.233 Grossman and Christensen frame the premise for their book in the 
introduction section.234 
There are only two kinds of people once the bullets start to fly: 
warriors and victims, those who fight and those who are 
unprepared, unable or unwilling to defend themselves. Since you 
chose to pick up this book, I assume that you walk the warrior’s 
path.  
Today the peacekeepers and the peace officers are moving toward 
each other. Around the world, warriors in blue (police and other 
peace officers) and warriors in green (soldiers, marines and other 
peacekeepers) find themselves facing the same kind of 
missions.235 
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Throughout the book, Grossman and Christensen extol the virtues of the 
warrior, with police officers included in that category.236 The ethos of the warrior 
conjures images of heroic figures who are brave, skilled, and resolute. It builds 
pride and esteem, and sets one apart from the masses. Whether Grossman and 
Christensen’s book was the flash point of applying the label, the fact remains that 
many police officers have enthusiastically embraced the distinction of being 
called a warrior.237  
A story in one section of their book has been particularly inculcated into 
police lore.238  The story is the fable of the sheep, the sheepdog, and the wolf.239 
In the fable, attributed to an unnamed Vietnam War era colonel, citizens are 
identified as “sheep.”240 He explains that sheep have no proclivity to commit 
violence but are victims of violent acts perpetrated by “wolves” who commit evil 
deeds.241 The sheep’s only protectors are the “sheepdogs.”242 Law enforcement 
and military personnel are specifically identified as the warriors or “sheepdogs” 
that protect the “sheep.”243 The fable concludes with the following 
pronouncement.  
If you have no capacity for violence then you are a healthy 
productive citizen: a sheep. If you have a capacity for violence and 
no empathy for your fellow citizens, then you have defined an 
aggressive sociopath— a wolf. But what if you have a capacity for 
violence, and a deep love for your fellow citizens? Then you are a 
sheepdog, a warrior, someone who is walking the hero’s path. 
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Someone who can walk into the heart of darkness, into the 
universal human phobia, and walk out unscathed.244  
After relaying the fable, Grossman and Christensen expound on the analogy, 
pointing out the similarities of the sheepdog and the wolf, their fangs and their 
penchant for violence.245 However, Grossman and Christensen emphatically 
stress that unlike the wolf, the sheepdog must never harm the sheep.246  
While their tale may be entertaining and instill esprit de corps in police 
officers that read or hear it, the famed fable is flawed in its analogy. In nature, 
wolves and sheep are easily distinguishable. They belong to entirely different 
species. Conversely, in human society, people are of the same species. There is 
no way to visually discern between good people or evil people. They both look 
like “sheep” to use Grossman and Christensen’s analogy. Following this 
reasoning, police officers might perceive all “sheep” to be possible “wolves” and 
interact with them accordingly. 
Whether Grossman and Christensen initiated the warrior mythos is 
unknown. Nevertheless, amalgamating police and military is contrary to the 
Posse Comitatus Act that was passed by the United States Congress in 1878.247 
The Posse Comitatus Act specifically prohibits the use of the military for domestic 
law enforcement purposes.248 Since that time, the police and the military have 
had separate and divergent missions. Blurring the line of demarcation may have 
had some subconscious sway on the police during the demonstrations in 
Ferguson, Missouri, in August of 2014.249 At the Ferguson protests, 
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demonstrators were confronted by police officers using military style weapons, 
vehicles, and apparel.250  
Undoubtedly there were other motivating factors in the police response in 
Ferguson and to the alleged militarization of American law enforcement. For 
instance, an overemphasis on officer safety and survival pervades law 
enforcement training regimens.251 Police officers are taught to consider any 
situation as possibly harmful.252 Police psychologist, Dr. Kevin Gilmartin, has 
labeled this heightened awareness “hypervigilance.”253 In this hyper-vigilant 
state, police officers may perceive seemingly innocuous behavior as potentially 
life threatening.254 While adaptability and resiliency are desired traits for officers, 
in actuality, very few citizens are intent on harming the police.255 According to the 
National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund, officers have less than a 2% 
chance of being assaulted.256  
One possible reason for police officers fearing that they may be harmed is 
explained through the Availability Heuristic. The Availability Heuristic asserts that 
individuals will assess the probability of an event occurring based on examples 
they can easily recall.257 If instances of officers suffering harm during routine 
tasks are prominent in the minds of the police, they may fixate on that possibility, 
act apprehensive of others, and be quick to take action. Taking quick action is 
undisputedly important in some situations. However, misperceiving behaviors of 
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others due to an unrealistic perspective may lead to inappropriate or misapplied 
force.  
Police training courses contain ample examples, including video 
recordings, of police officers being harmed and killed during traffic stops and 
other routine tasks.258 While it is critical for officers to understand the dangers of 
their job and train to counteract them, fixating on the dangers could result in the 
misuse of force. Police training curriculum needs to point out the hazards of the 
job, but it also needs to emphasize the remote chances of them occurring.  
Although the probabilities of being injured in the line of duty are low, 
according to Gilmartin, law enforcement officers lean towards being suspicious of 
others.259 Additionally, officers tend to see individuals and situations 
disparagingly.260 They frequently interact with individuals who have committed 
crimes or have acted unwisely, which leads to cynicism and sometimes 
pejorative labeling of those outside an officer’s in-group.261  
B. POSITIONING THEORY AND THE WARRIOR VERSUS GUARDIAN 
DEBATE 
Slocum-Bradley’s principles mentioned in Chapter II could be used to 
analyze and perhaps resolve the warrior versus guardian debate. For example, 
her second peace promoting point recommends, “identifying people as members 
of the same group.”262 As was shown in the town versus gown incident, people 
who identify themselves as belonging to the same group tend to perceive that 
they have equal rights and duties.263 Applying the same label to everyone in a 
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situation helps remove tension and barriers in the form of in-group versus out-
group dynamics. 
The argument for not using special labels for police officers is also 
supported by a set of values taught to 19th Century police officers. In 1829, Sir 
Robert Peel helped established the Metropolitan Police in London, England.264  
When it was formed, every Metropolitan police recruit was given a list of 
principles referred to as Robert Peel’s Nine Principles of Policing. Although it 
bears his name, historians believe the attribution is apocryphal.265 Nevertheless, 
principle number seven reads,  
To maintain at all times a relationship with the public that gives 
reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and that 
the public are the police, the police being only members of the 
public who are paid to give full time attention to duties which are 
incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare 
and existence [emphasis added].266  
In light of Peel and Slocum-Bradley’s principles, perhaps it is imprudent to 
apply any superordinate labels to the police. Officers need to remember that 
while they may have received specialized training in law enforcement, all citizens 
have the duty to participate in efforts to maintain a safe and lawful society. In 
some states, such as Idaho, citizens have rights equal to the police to enforce 
statutes through citizens’ arrest authority.267  
Law enforcement officers are an integral part of the community and are 
dependent on their fellow community members for assistance in maintaining 
order and safety. As with any job, police work does have inherent risks. However, 
those risks should not overshadow or dominate the true purpose for the 
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existence of law enforcement, that of working with and serving their fellow 
citizens.  
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IV. ANALYSIS OF FORCE AND DE-ESCALATION TRAINING 
The foundation for a police officer’s career is built during initial training in 
the police academy. Thus, the content of the core curriculum delivered to new 
recruits is of paramount importance. However, there are no national training 
standards that all officers are required to meet in the United States. Each 
individual state sets their own training standards and minimum qualifications for 
law enforcement officers and police academies.  
The critical nature of police training requires thorough and constant 
oversight of the curriculum, which is typically accomplished by an executive and 
a governing board in each state. Each governing board establishes a minimum 
number of training hours for each core topic, and each police agency is required 
to adhere to the standards. The executive who is responsible for police standards 
and training in each state belongs to the International Association of Directors of 
Law Enforcement Standards and Training or IADLEST. Some United States 
territories, military police, and federal law enforcement are also represented in 
the IADLEST.268 
As part of this thesis, a survey was conducted among members of the 
IADLEST. Instructions for the survey directed the executive in each state to 
complete the survey or delegate it to a person on the training staff who had the 
most knowledge of their training requirements. The survey was conducted to 
determine the minimum number of training hours assigned to force and de-
escalation topics. The results of the survey given to IADLEST members will be 
compared to a similar survey that was conducted by the Police Executive 
Research Forum (PERF). The Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model of 
decision-making will be applied to the results of both surveys as part of the 
analysis and discussion. 
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A. POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM SURVEY 
Police officers wield broad authority as they perform their duties. They are 
bestowed with the right to temporarily deny citizens’ freedoms, and ultimately 
hold the legal justification to use lethal force in defense of their life or the life of 
another. Consequently, training standards are of the utmost importance and must 
be carefully crafted and approved by governing public officials. The responsibility 
of ensuring adherence to the training standards is entrusted to the training and 
standards executive and council in each state.  
During training, a new police officer accumulates and refines skills, 
knowledge, and perceptions of the profession. While new capabilities are learned 
through the initial educational process, a novice officer’s intrinsic abilities and 
attitudes are enhanced or attenuated through training. Some law enforcement 
techniques that require fine motor skills must be relearned and refreshed 
throughout a police officer’s career. These perishable skills are learned in basic 
training and then reviewed during in-service training sessions that focus on 
maintaining techniques that are critical to the officers’ safety and the safety of 
those they serve.  
A portion of basic and continuing education training for officers is 
dedicated to the use of force. The word “force” when used in a law enforcement 
context is a broad term that includes weaponry such as firearms, aerosol irritants, 
blunt impact weapons, and electronic control devices sometimes referred to as 
Tasers.269 It also encompasses empty hand defensive and offensive techniques 
such as blocks, strikes, kicks, joint manipulation, and pressure point control 
tactics.  
In an attempt to determine the status of police training in the United 
States, the PERF conducted a survey in 2015 of 280 police agencies.270 The 
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survey collected the number of training hours devoted to different topics.271 The 
results of the survey show a high number of training hours dedicated to topics 
associated with the use of force, while few training hours are assigned to learning 
skills to avoid using force.272 The results of the PERF survey shown in Figure 7, 
displays 129 hours as the median number of hours given to each cadet to learn 
about firearms, defensive tactics, and other topics of force.273 By contrast, the 
median number of hours spent studying solely de-escalation topics was 16.274  
“Con Law” is interpreted as Constitutional Law. “UoF” is understood as Use of Force. 
“ECW” is translated as Electronic Control Weapon commonly referred to as “Taser.” 
“OC Spray” is read as Oleoresin Capsicum Spray. 





275 Source: Ibid. 
 56 
It is understandable that police executives would spend a considerable 
amount of time dedicated to training on high-risk activities such as force. 
However, this significant imbalance might subconsciously lead law enforcement 
officers to unduly rely on those skills when dealing with the public, particularly in 
stressful situations. The RPD model of decision-making—which states that 
individuals facing time-limited, volatile situations rely on prior experiences to 
arrive at a decision—supports this supposition.276  
B. SURVEY METHODOLOGY 
A survey was distributed to the members of IADLEST in order to ascertain 
if any changes had occurred to the general training curriculum since the PERF 
survey was conducted. The IADLEST survey included 12 questions. The first 
eight questions requested information on the required minimum number of 
training hours taught on specified topics such as firearms and de-escalation. 
These questions were based on the PERF survey’s queries.  
The next four questions probed other aspects of police recruit training not 
addressed in the PERF survey. Question nine asked for the required minimum 
number of training hours dedicated to scenario-based training. In Questions 10, 
11, and 12, the respondents were asked to provide a percentage of the number 
of times scenarios required either firearms or other force tactics, or de-escalation 
techniques to correctly complete the scenario. A copy of the survey questions is 
provided in Appendix A.  
The IADLEST survey was completed and submitted anonymously using 
online software from Survey Monkey Incorporated. A representative of IADLEST 
tracked which members responded so as to ensure there were no duplicate 
surveys. However, that information was not forwarded to this author, and all 
tracking functions within the Survey Monkey Incorporated software were disabled 
to ensure the anonymity of those who completed the survey. 
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C. SURVEY RESULTS 
Surveys were delivered to the members of IADLEST and 15 were returned 
completed. However, some participants did not provide a numerical response to 
some questions, which limited the data that was available to tabulate results. The 
unedited responses of the 15 surveys that were returned are displayed in 
Appendix B. Appendix C contains computation tables of the data, including the 
median numbers, average numbers, and percentages of training hours provided 
to recruits.  
Scenario-based training hours reported on the IADLEST survey varied 
considerably from zero to 800, with an average of 102 hours and a median of 42 
hours. The percentage of training scenarios that required the discharge of a 
firearm to correctly resolve the scenario ranged from 2.5% to 10% with an 
average of 8% and a median percentage of 10%. The scenario-based training 
question vis-à-vis the use of weapons other than a firearm had percentages 
ranging from 5% to 90%, with an average of 25% and a median of 20%. For 
scenarios requiring the use of de-escalation only, the percentages ranged from 
5% to 95% with an average of 51% and a median of 65%. Refer to Appendix C 
for a comprehensive review of all the data. The results of the IADLEST survey 
are graphically depicted in Figure 8. Questions about Con Law/Legal Issues, 
Basic First-Aid, and Communication Skills posed in the PERF survey were not 
asked in the IADLEST survey.  
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Figure 8.  IADLEST Survey Results. 
D. DISCUSSION 
The debate over the use of force by police officers has been ongoing for 
many years. However, its prominence in the public discourse has elevated since 
2014, and it appears to be at or nearing a crescendo. As an example, PERF 
released a publication in January of 2016 entitled Use of Force: Taking Policing 
to a Higher Standard.277 The publication outlined “30 Guiding Principles” to 
reduce the incidents of force by police officers in the United States.278 Since 
PERF’s 30 principles were published, they have received criticism from various 
law enforcement groups such as the International Association of Chiefs of Police 
(IACP).279 Even the Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy 
Associates (FBINAA) has asked their national and international members for 
feedback and input before formulating a response to PERF’s publication.280 
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Conducting such a query of its membership is unprecedented in recent FBINAA 
history. 
Along with the IACP, the Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs 
(ALADS) denounced PERF’s attempt to establish a new standard for defining 
appropriate use of force that exceeds the one set by the United States Supreme 
Court. ALADS argued that the PERF’s principles could place a police officer in 
the position of obeying the law of the land yet acting contrary to standards 
arbitrarily set by agencies. ALADS also took exception to the PERF principle that 
suggests a police officer reflects on how the public might view a use of force, 
prior to using force. Attempting to ascertain ephemeral public opinion places the 
officer in a near impossible position, especially during highly volatile and rapidly 
evolving situations.281 
The survey on force and de-escalation was given to the IADLEST 
members during this period when the discourse on the topic was elevated and 
emotionally charged. The low return of surveys may have been due in part to the 
debate in law enforcement circles over force versus de-escalation. Nevertheless, 
with one exception, the results of the IADLEST survey and the PERF survey 
yielded similar results. The PERF survey and the IADLEST survey are 
aggregated in Figure 9 for ease of comparison.  
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PERF data obtained from PERF report.282 
Figure 9.  Aggregation of PERF and IADLEST Surveys. 
 The one significant difference between the PERF survey and the 
IADLEST survey was found in the category of scenario-based training hours. As 
shown in Figure 9, training hours are fairly consistent between the two surveys 
with the exception of scenario-based training hours. The difference in this 
category could have resulted from the format of the question. The PERF question 
was labeled “use of force based scenario training.” while the survey of the 
IADLEST membership requested hours for all scenario-based training. The 
objective of the question in the IADLEST survey was to capture all scenario-
based training hours, even those using only de-escalation techniques. However, 
it is possible that other scenario-based training that did not include elements of 
handling conflict could have been included in the total numbers of hours in the 
IADLEST responses. Examples of scenario-based training that does not include 
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resolving conflict are motor vehicle accident scene investigation or administering 
field sobriety tests for detecting impaired driving.  
An initial hypothesis of this research, which aligned with RPD, posited that 
an overemphasis on firearms and force in police training might predispose 
officers to use force or firearms in volatile situations. The results of the IADLEST 
survey calculate to an 8.9 to 1 ratio of training hours dedicated to force topics 
versus training hours devoted to de-escalation topics. While it is clear that force 
topics consume a significant percentage of training hours, the IADLEST survey 
results point to a de-emphasis of force and firearms during scenario-based 
training. The median percentage of scenarios that mandated firearms or force to 
successfully complete them was 10% and 20% respectively. On the other hand, 
a median percentage of 65% of all training scenarios were appropriately resolved 
using de-escalation techniques only. Even though non-conflict related scenarios 
could have been included in the results of the training scenarios that required 
only de-escalation to resolve, the results suggest that a majority of scenarios 
train police officers to use de-escalation.  
Both surveys suggest that training hours are much higher for firearms and 
force than for de-escalation. However, during scenario-based training, de-
escalation is emphasized. Interpreting these findings within the framework of 
RPD would support the theory that police recruits are provided experiences in 
successful use of de-escalation to draw upon when confronted with actual, real-
world volatile encounters. While this finding is promising, it must be remembered 
that it is based on limited number of responses.  
The IADLEST survey results on scenario-based training may be favorable 
to de-escalation, however, the required use of firearms in training scenarios still 
appears to be overrepresented when compared to real-world experiences. For 
instance, the New York Police Department published statistics in 2011 on the 
number of times one of their police officers discharged a firearm “during [an] 
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adversarial conflict.”283 The New York report documented that 62 officers had 
fired their weapons when confronted with a volatile situation.284 Nevertheless, 
the number of police interactions with citizens was estimated at 23 million during 
the same time period.285 From these data, it can be calculated that an officer in 
New York would have a 0.0003% probability of needing to discharge a firearm 
while interacting with citizens during the course of a year. When compared to 
the low probability of discharging a firearm, the IADLEST survey’s result of a 
10% rate of using a firearm in training scenarios points to an 
overrepresentation of firearms in the training curriculum. Applying the results of 
the IADLEST survey to the RPD framework leads to a conclusion that 
new police officers are predisposed by their training experiences to use 
firearms at a higher rate than is needed in real-world situations.  
283 Raymond W. Kelly, “2011 Annual firearms Discharge Report,” New York City Police 





V. RECOMMENDATIONS  
The discussion on Positioning Theory (PT) supported the supposition that 
its principles could be leveraged for peaceful resolutions in encounters between 
the police and the public. Slocum-Bradley’s lists of discursive acts that promote 
peace provide strategies that could be employed to aid de-escalation.286 Based 
on the principles she formulated, the first recommendation is that no 
superordinate labels, such as warrior or guardian, be applied to police officers. 
Labels create in-group versus out-group acts and attitudes, which can be 
divisive. Rather, it is proposed that an emphasis is place on the position that law 
enforcement officers are part of the community with the recognition that all 
members of society have rights and duties for the care and welfare of the 
community members.  
Additionally, it is recommended that the citizenry, which includes the 
police, be periodically reminded that the overwhelming majority of citizens are 
law-abiding members of society. It should be remembered that most people have 
nonthreatening intentions.287 It is further suggested that officers be discouraged 
from engaging in speech acts that disparage, vilify, and denounce others.288 
They are counterproductive and do nothing to reduce crime or make 
communities safer. 
Police officers need effective skills and techniques that can be utilized to 
restore peace in tumultuous situations. Research supporting the effectiveness of 
the Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) model at reducing the use of force is meager 
at best. However, CIT techniques have received national acceptance as effective 
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methods for resolving conflicts with individuals suffering from mental illness.289 
As was shown in Chapter IV, most police recruits are given some level of CIT 
training in the basic police academy. The PERF survey found that police recruits 
are provided with a median number of eight hours of crisis intervention 
training.290 The IADLEST survey data showed that six hours of crisis intervention 
training are given to new police officers. Neither the PERF survey nor the 
IADLEST survey detailed the content of the training courses. It is unknown 
whether the eight and six hours of crisis intervention training were occupied with 
lectures or role-playing exercises. The Memphis model of CIT calls for 9.5 hours 
of scenario-based training on de-escalation skills.291 One study on CIT 
recommended an emphasis on scenario-based training to practice and assimilate 
de-escalation techniques.292 However, this study suggested that de-escalation 
skills diminish over time.293 Based on a review of the current research, it is 
recommended that CIT training delivered to police recruits be comprised mostly 
of role-playing exercises, and for that training to be repeated periodically 
throughout a police officer’s career. The training curricula should emphasize role-
playing opportunities that provide diverse options, highlighting de-escalation, to 
successfully complete the scenario.  
The suggestion of emphasizing scenario-based training is aligned with the 
Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model discussed in Chapters II and IV. 
Additionally, it coincides with the successful training program implemented by the 
Richmond (California) Police Department. In addition to recommending an 
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emphasis on scenario-based training, it is proposed that Richmond’s quarterly 
training curriculum be closely examined for possible replication in other police 
agencies. 
Based on the findings of Chapter IV, it is suggested that additional training 
hours be dedicated to learning and applying de-escalation techniques. Parity 
should be achieved in the number of training hours assigned to force, and de-
escalation. It is further recommended for scenario-based training to more 
accurately reflect real-world probabilities. In other words, there is a need for a 
reduction in training scenarios that require firearms to successfully complete the 
role-playing exercise, and an increase in scenarios that require de-escalation to 
correctly resolve the exercise. 
 It is also suggested that a national standardized definition of de-
escalation be established in order to more accurately categorize and document 
training hours dedicated to the subject. In the IADLEST survey, 87% of the 
respondents were able to provide a specific number of hours of instruction time 
for firearms and force classes. Conversely, only 60% of the IADLEST survey 
participants responded with a precise number of training hours identified for de-
escalation. It is possible that fewer respondents were able to articulate an exact 
number of training hours for de-escalation due to the lack of a universal definition 
for the term.  
It is recommended that United States police agencies reject the adoption 
of the Police Executive Research Forum’s Critical Decision-Making Model 
(CDMM). While it may be feasible to follow the principles of the CDMM in 
countries that have significantly fewer privately owned firearms, it would not be a 
safe framework to use in the United States. On the other hand, it is suggested 
that United States police agencies adopt strategies and tactics from other 
countries including the United Kingdom’s strategy of tactically withdrawing in 
situations where it would be reasonable and safe for everyone involved to do so. 
Additionally, it is proposed that police agencies in the United States could benefit 
from adopting the 10 Operational Safety Principles of Project Beacon from 
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Victoria (Australia) Police. In doing so, agencies should not overlook the lesson 
learned by the Victorian police of the critical need for constant and persistent 
refresher and reinforcement training in the principles of Project Beacon.  
It is further recommended that United States police administrators explore 
the possible benefits of utilizing the Tasmania (Australia) Police Job Suitability 
Test or some adaptation of it. Many United States police agencies already use 
personality tests like the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory during their 
hiring processes.294 It may not be difficult to modify this step of the hiring process 
in the United States if further study of the Tasmanian model proves to be 
beneficial at reducing the use of force. 
To motivate police agencies and their officers to implement de-escalation 
strategies, it is recommended that monetary incentives be offered to them in the 
form of grants of overtime money for officers participating in de-escalation 
courses. Additionally, it is suggested that financial rewards be given to police 
agencies that reduce use of force incidents, similar to how insurance companies 
offer discounts to members who participate in preventative measures.  
It is proposed that police agencies be required to submit statistical data to 
the Federal Bureau of Investigations’ Uniform Crime Report and that the data be 
made easily accessible to the public. This should lead to greater awareness and 
accountability. It is further recommended that the practices and procedures of 
police agencies that have reduced the use of force in their jurisdiction be widely 
disseminated to all law enforcement agencies to provide positive peer pressure.  
                                            
294 Gary L. Fischler, “Identifying Psychological Predictors of Police Officer Integrity 




VI. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Several areas for future research were revealed during the compilation of 
data and information for this thesis. For example, a dearth of research supporting 
or disproving the effectiveness of Crisis Intervention Teams (CITs) at reducing 
the use of force was discovered. Future research should be undertaken to 
demonstrate the proficiency of CITs at reducing the use of force. Future research 
should be conducted of actual incidents, based on consistent standards, that 
compare CIT trained officers and officers without CIT training. This research 
should not be based on hypothetical scenarios and questionnaires about officers’ 
perceptions and intentions. What people think they would do or hope they would 
do, many times is different than what they actually do.  
It would also be educational and productive to research whether CIT 
trained officers use less force in all situations, not just those involving individuals 
suffering from mental illnesses. Research of this type could help establish a 
standardized de-escalation training regimen for all police officers. Other areas of 
possible research could be an in-depth study of the Tasmania (Australia) Police 
Job Suitability Test and the quarterly scenario-based training curriculum of the 
Richmond (California) Police Department. Both programs warrant closer 
examination for possible replication if research supports their reported 
achievements at reducing the use of force. 
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Police in the United States are at a crossroads. It is the perception of 
some members of society that law enforcement is not using techniques to ensure 
the safety of all individuals, and they have demanded changes in strategies and 
tactics that are less harmful.295 Police officials should adjust to satisfy these calls 
for change or risk weakening the authority granted to them by the citizenry. The 
United States was built upon the precepts of “safety and happiness” and formed 
a government to uphold these ideals.296 The Declaration of Independence 
affirms,  
That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among 
Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, --
That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of 
these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and 
to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such 
principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall 
seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.297  
Undoubtedly, the overwhelming majority of police officers seek to provide peace 
and security for their citizens. Nevertheless, if strategies exist that could 
accomplish the safety and happiness of society while better safeguarding all 
citizens, it is incumbent on law enforcement to explore, adopt, and implement 
those strategies. 
This thesis attempted to clarify the issues surrounding the perceived 
inappropriate use of force by police officers. It offered theories on decision-
making and understanding on human interactions. It also provided 
recommendations on measures that could be undertaken to reduce the use of 
force in police and citizen encounters.  
                                            
295 “A Unified Statement of Action to Promote Reform and Stop Police Abuse,” ACLU, 
August 18, 2014, https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/black_leaders_joint_statement_-
_final_-_8-18.pdf. 




A. POSITIONING THEORY 
Educating officers on the concepts of Positioning Theory (PT) could 
provide awareness of the significance of words and labels during interactions 
with others. Teaching them about PT could help strengthen de-escalation skills 
by instructing them in peace-promoting positions, speech acts, and storylines. 
Understanding and being aware of these maneuvers and subtleties can be 
leveraged to achieve peaceful conclusions to conflicts. Moreover, the principles 
of PT suggest worthwhile solutions to the warrior versus guardian kerfuffle and 
the cynicism that has the potential of permeating the perceptions police officers 
may have. For example, projecting equal rights and duties to all people promotes 
peace while allocating disparate rights and duties encourages conflict.298 
Assigning superordinate labels to the police and allocating pejorative terms to the 
public sets up dissimilar groups with unequal rights and duties. And, as 
mentioned by Slocum-Bradley, marginalizing and denigrating others fuels 
conflict.299 Officers should be framed as common members of society, who along 
with all other community members, have the rights and duties to serve and 
protect.  
B. CRISIS INTERVENTION TEAMS 
While law enforcement practitioners, community leaders, and citizens are 
looking for answers to the perceived misapplied force problem in the United 
States, the Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) model has not been proven to be a 
viable answer. Intuitively it seems like it should be effective at reducing force. 
However, the research reviewed for this thesis did not compellingly support the 
premise that CIT de-escalation techniques decrease the use of force. Law 
enforcement agencies and CIT programs should analyze successful training 
regimens to assess techniques they can adopt to de-escalate tense situations 
involving officers and mental health patients.  
                                            
298 Nikki Slocum-Bradley, Promoting Conflict or Peace Through Identity (Burlington, 




Attempts by governments and communities to reduce police violence are 
undertaken worldwide, and methods, policies, and philosophies that aim to 
reduce the use of force are distinct from country to country. Violent criminals 
around the globe may have similar goals of harming the police. However, the 
availability, variety, and lethality of weapons limit their capability to do harm, 
which leads to divergent policies and procedures. Still, it is a worthwhile 
endeavor to explore how various foreign law enforcement agencies deal with the 
issue of safely policing their communities while doing as little harm to their 
citizens as possible. Reducing the level and occurrence of force used by law 
enforcement officers has become a contentious topic in the United States. 
Opinions are sharp and positions are entrenched. Empathetic listening by all 
involved is vital to strengthening relationships and arriving at solutions. Acting on 
proposed solutions should be made in a well thought out manner.  
Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) provides insight to likely reasons why 
police officers have shot some unarmed individuals, and leads to a viable 
solution to counter that impulse. The literature on RPD suggested that in time-
limited, stressful circumstances, individuals rely on past experiences to formulate 
contingencies to successfully resolve the given situation.300 Research supports 
the premise that police recruit training overemphasizes force and firearms. Police 
officers need to be given a diverse training experience, with a more equal 
balance of force and de-escalation options. It is believed that this will result in 
police interactions with citizens being resolved in a manner that is safer for both 
the officers and the citizens. 
A comment by ALADS’ Vice President Sean Van Leeuwen’s 
denunciations of PERF’s 30 Guiding Principles coincides with the premise of this 
                                            
300 Gary A. Klein, “Naturalistic Decision Making,” Human Factors 3, June 2008, 456–460, 
doi: 10.1518/001872008X288385. 
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research.301 Van Leeuwen stated, “Uses of force don’t occur in a vacuum. They 
are usually fluid, rapidly evolving situations which require split-second decisions 
based on an individual officer’s training, experience and assessment of the 
situation unfolding in in front of them.”302 Van Leeuwen’s description is a succinct 
summary and affirmation of RPD. Familiarity with various techniques to 
appropriately resolve situations will help ensure the safety of the officers and the 
people they interact with. 
Educating citizens on the values and objectives held by the police is 
important. However, listening to the public’s input is vital to strengthening 
relationships. Furthermore, listening and then acting on that input is critical in 
maintaining the trust and confidence the public has in the police. Citizens in a 
liberal democracy have the right and the responsibility to help craft the rules and 
regulations the police are to follow. Police officers are vital to the security of their 
communities. However, they are dependent on their fellow community members 
for assistance in maintaining order and safety. As with any job, police work does 
have inherent risks. Nevertheless, those risks should not overshadow or 
dominate the true purpose for the existence of the police, that of working with 
and serving their fellow citizens. When the police and the public work together, 
society can be made safer for everyone. 
                                            
301 Sean Van Leeuwen, “Cops Should Help Define the Use of Force Standards,” Association 
for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs Blog 2016, http://myemail.constantcontact.com/Cops-Should-
Help-Define-the-Use-of-Force-Standards.html?soid=1119707513166&aid=MrXSkgMHvXg. 
302 Ibid.  
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APPENDIX A. SURVEY QUESTIONS 
Note: This research was not formally reviewed by the NPS Human 
Research Protection Program Office & Institutional Review Board, but it was 
made aware of this work and approved publication without a formal review. 
 
1. What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Firearms? (safe-handling, cleaning, 
shooting, qualifying, etc.) ___ 
 
2. What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Defensive Tactics? (inclusive of 
arrest techniques, ground fighting, Krav Maga, etc.) ___ 
 
3. What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Impact weapons? ___ 
 
4. What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Electronic Control Devices? ___ 
 
5. What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on OC Spray? ___ 
 
6. What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on De-escalation? ___ 
 
7. What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Crisis Intervention? ___ 
 
8. What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Use of force policy? ___ 
 
9. What is the required minimum number of scenario based training hours 
taught to new law enforcement officers in your state? ___ 
 
10. What percentage of training scenarios requires the discharge of a firearm 
to correctly resolve the scenario? ___ 
 
11. What percentage of training scenarios requires the use of force other than 
the discharge of a firearm, such as the use of an electronic control device, 
baton, or OC spray, to correctly resolve the scenario? ___ 
 
12. What percentage of scenarios requires only de-escalation techniques to 
resolve the scenario? ___ 
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APPENDIX B. SURVEY RESPONSES 
Return #1 
Q1: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Firearms? (safe-handling, cleaning, 
shooting, qualifying, etc.) 
56 
 
Q2: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Defensive Tactics? (inclusive of arrest 
techniques, ground fighting, Krav Maga, etc.) 
58 
 
Q3: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Impact weapons? 
8 
 
Q4: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Electronic Control Devices? 
Currently 4, but we are in the process of changing it to 6 hours 
 
Q5: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on OC Spray? 
3, plus the practical exercise where the student is sprayed and must perform a 
series of tasks after being sprayed. 
 
Q6: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on De-escalation? 
We do not teach “de-escalation” as a separate topic. It is incorporated into our 
use-of-force and interpersonal communication training. 
 
Q7: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Crisis Intervention? 
12 
 
Q8: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 




Q9: What is the required minimum number of scenario based training hours 
taught to new law enforcement officers in your state? 
42 
 
Q10: What percentage of training scenarios requires the discharge of a firearm to 
correctly resolve the scenario? 
10% 
 
Q11: What percentage of training scenarios requires the use of force other than 
the discharge of a firearm, such as the use of an electronic control device, baton, 
or OC spray, to correctly resolve the scenario? 
90% 
 
Q12: What percentage of scenarios requires only de-escalation techniques to 
resolve the scenario? 






Q1: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Firearms? (safe-handling, cleaning, 
shooting, qualifying, etc.) 
0 
 
Q2: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Defensive Tactics? (inclusive of arrest 
techniques, ground fighting, Krav Maga, etc.) 
0 
 
Q3: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Impact weapons? 
0 
 
Q4: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Electronic Control Devices? 
O 
 
Q5: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on OC Spray? 
O 
 
Q6: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on De-escalation? 
O 
 
Q7: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Crisis Intervention? 
O 
 
Q8: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Use of force policy? 
O 
 
Q9: What is the required minimum number of scenario based training hours 
taught to new law enforcement officers in your state? 
O 
 
Q10: What percentage of training scenarios requires the discharge of a firearm to 
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correctly resolve the scenario? 
5 
 
Q11: What percentage of training scenarios requires the use of force other than 
the discharge of a firearm, such as the use of an electronic control device, baton, 
or OC spray, to correctly resolve the scenario? 
10 
 
Q12: What percentage of scenarios requires only de-escalation techniques to 







Q1: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Firearms? (safe-handling, cleaning, 
shooting, qualifying, etc.) 
40 
 
Q2: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Defensive Tactics? (inclusive of arrest 
techniques, ground fighting, Krav Maga, etc.) 
40 
 
Q3: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Impact weapons? 
20 
 
Q4: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Electronic Control Devices? 
0 
 
Q5: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on OC Spray? 
8 
 
Q6: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on De-escalation? 
40 
 
Q7: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Crisis Intervention? 
8 
 
Q8: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Use of force policy? 
8 
 
Q9: What is the required minimum number of scenario based training hours 
taught to new law enforcement officers in your state? 
60+ 
 
Q10: What percentage of training scenarios requires the discharge of a firearm to 
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correctly resolve the scenario? 
1-5% 
 
Q11: What percentage of training scenarios requires the use of force other than 
the discharge of a firearm, such as the use of an electronic control device, baton, 
or OC spray, to correctly resolve the scenario? 
5-10% 
 
Q12: What percentage of scenarios requires only de-escalation techniques to 







Q1: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Firearms? (safe-handling, cleaning, 
shooting, qualifying, etc.) 
80 
 
Q2: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Defensive Tactics? (inclusive of arrest 
techniques, ground fighting, Krav Maga, etc.) 
80 
 
Q3: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Impact weapons? 
40 
 
Q4: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Electronic Control Devices? 
N/A 
 
Q5: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on OC Spray? 
8 
 
Q6: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on De-escalation? 
8 
 
Q7: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Crisis Intervention? 
16 
 
Q8: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Use of force policy? 
24 
 
Q9: What is the required minimum number of scenario based training hours 
taught to new law enforcement officers in your state? 
800 
 
Q10: What percentage of training scenarios requires the discharge of a firearm to 
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correctly resolve the scenario? 
N/A 
 
Q11: What percentage of training scenarios requires the use of force other than 
the discharge of a firearm, such as the use of an electronic control device, baton, 
or OC spray, to correctly resolve the scenario? 
N/A 
 
Q12: What percentage of scenarios requires only de-escalation techniques to 






Q1: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Firearms? (safe-handling, cleaning, 
shooting, qualifying, etc.) 
60 
 
Q2: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Defensive Tactics? (inclusive of arrest 
techniques, ground fighting, Krav Maga, etc.) 
70 
 
Q3: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Impact weapons? 
8 
 
Q4: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Electronic Control Devices? 
0 
 
Q5: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on OC Spray? 
0 
 
Q6: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on De-escalation? 
20 
 
Q7: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Crisis Intervention? 
20 
 
Q8: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Use of force policy? 
6 
 
Q9: What is the required minimum number of scenario based training hours 
taught to new law enforcement officers in your state? 
Difficult to accurately determine 
 
Q10: What percentage of training scenarios requires the discharge of a firearm to 
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correctly resolve the scenario? 
Difficult to answer 
 
Q11: What percentage of training scenarios requires the use of force other than 
the discharge of a firearm, such as the use of an electronic control device, baton, 
or OC spray, to correctly resolve the scenario? 
Difficult to answer 
 
Q12: What percentage of scenarios requires only de-escalation techniques to 
resolve the scenario? 






Q1: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Firearms? (safe-handling, cleaning, 
shooting, qualifying, etc.) 
47 hours 
 
Q2: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Defensive Tactics? (inclusive of arrest 
techniques, ground fighting, Krav Maga, etc.) 
47 hours 
 
Q3: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Impact weapons? 
4hours 
 
Q4: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Electronic Control Devices? 
0 
 
Q5: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on OC Spray? 
2 
 
Q6: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on De-escalation? 
8 
 
Q7: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Crisis Intervention? 
4 
 
Q8: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Use of force policy? 
8 
 
Q9: What is the required minimum number of scenario based training hours 
taught to new law enforcement officers in your state? 
16 
 
Q10: What percentage of training scenarios requires the discharge of a firearm to 
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correctly resolve the scenario? 
> 5% 
 
Q11: What percentage of training scenarios requires the use of force other than 
the discharge of a firearm, such as the use of an electronic control device, baton, 
or OC spray, to correctly resolve the scenario? 
> 20 % 
 
Q12: What percentage of scenarios requires only de-escalation techniques to 






Q1: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Firearms? (safe-handling, cleaning, 
shooting, qualifying, etc.) 
50 Hours minimum; almost all academies well over that 
 
Q2: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Defensive Tactics? (inclusive of arrest 
techniques, ground fighting, Krav Maga, etc.) 
40 Hours min; most are over this number of hours 
 
Q3: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Impact weapons? 
10 hours. 
 
Q4: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Electronic Control Devices? 
Nothing designated by the state and academy level 
 
Q5: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on OC Spray? 
5 hours 
 
Q6: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on De-escalation?  
approximately 20 in varies [sic] areas 
 
Q7: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Crisis Intervention?  
approximately 10 hours in varied areas 
 
Q8: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Use of force policy? 
approximately 15 hours in ares [sic] of Law of Arrest, DT, and Firearms 
 
Q9: What is the required minimum number of scenario based training hours 
taught to new law enforcement officers in your state? 
Respondent skipped this question 
 
Q10: What percentage of training scenarios requires the discharge of a firearm to 
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correctly resolve the scenario? 
Less than 10% 
 
Q11: What percentage of training scenarios requires the use of force other than 
the discharge of a firearm, such as the use of an electronic control device, baton, 
or OC spray, to correctly resolve the scenario? 
Less than 20% 
 
Q12: What percentage of scenarios requires only de-escalation techniques to 
resolve the scenario? 






Q1: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Firearms? (safe-handling, cleaning, 
shooting, qualifying, etc.) 
no specific number of hours mandaed [sic] 
 
Q2: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Defensive Tactics? (inclusive of arrest 
techniques, ground fighting, Krav Maga, etc.) 
no specific number of hours mandated 
 
Q3: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Impact weapons? 
see above 
 
Q4: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Electronic Control Devices? 
see above 
 
Q5: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on OC Spray? 
see above 
 
Q6: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on De-escalation? 
see above 
 
Q7: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Crisis Intervention? 
see above 
 
Q8: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Use of force policy? 
see above 
 
Q9: What is the required minimum number of scenario based training hours 
taught to new law enforcement officers in your state? 
see above 
 
Q10: What percentage of training scenarios requires the discharge of a firearm to 
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correctly resolve the scenario? 
less than 10% 
 
Q11: What percentage of training scenarios requires the use of force other than 
the discharge of a firearm, such as the use of an electronic control device, baton, 
or OC spray, to correctly resolve the scenario? 
less than 20% 
 
Q12: What percentage of scenarios requires only de-escalation techniques to 






Q1: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Firearms? (safe-handling, cleaning, 
shooting, qualifying, etc.) 
42 
 
Q2: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Defensive Tactics? (inclusive of arrest 
techniques, ground fighting, Krav Maga, etc.) 
44.5 
 
Q3: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Impact weapons? 
8.0 
 
Q4: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Electronic Control Devices? 
4 
 
Q5: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on OC Spray? 
8 
 
Q6: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on De-escalation? 
8 
 
Q7: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Crisis Intervention? 
4 
 
Q8: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Use of force policy? 
4 
 
Q9: What is the required minimum number of scenario based training hours 
taught to new law enforcement officers in your state? 
104 
 
Q10: What percentage of training scenarios requires the discharge of a firearm to 
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correctly resolve the scenario? 
10% 
 
Q11: What percentage of training scenarios requires the use of force other than 
the discharge of a firearm, such as the use of an electronic control device, baton, 
or OC spray, to correctly resolve the scenario? 
25% 
 
Q12: What percentage of scenarios requires only de-escalation techniques to 






Q1: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Firearms? (safe-handling, cleaning, 
shooting, qualifying, etc.) 
64 
 
Q2: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Defensive Tactics? (inclusive of arrest 
techniques, ground fighting, Krav Maga, etc.) 
62 
 
Q3: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Impact weapons? 
4 
 
Q4: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Electronic Control Devices? 
0 
 
Q5: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on OC Spray? 
0 
 
Q6: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on De-escalation? 
2 
 
Q7: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Crisis Intervention? 
0 
 
Q8: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Use of force policy? 
2 
 
Q9: What is the required minimum number of scenario based training hours 
taught to new law enforcement officers in your state? 
14 
 
Q10: What percentage of training scenarios requires the discharge of a firearm to 
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correctly resolve the scenario? 
Respondent skipped this question 
 
Q11: What percentage of training scenarios requires the use of force other than 
the discharge of a firearm, such as the use of an electronic control device, baton, 
or OC spray, to correctly resolve the scenario? 
Respondent skipped this question 
 
Q12: What percentage of scenarios requires only de-escalation techniques to 
resolve the scenario? 






Q1: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Firearms? (safe-handling, cleaning, 
shooting, qualifying, etc.) 
48 
 
Q2: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Defensive Tactics? (inclusive of arrest 
techniques, ground fighting, Krav Maga, etc.) 
40 
 
Q3: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Impact weapons? 
included in the 40 in #3 
 
Q4: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Electronic Control Devices? 
Not taught in academy 
 
Q5: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on OC Spray? 
Not taught in academy 
 
Q6: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on De-escalation? 
0 
 
Q7: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Crisis Intervention? 
4 
 
Q8: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Use of force policy? 
5 
 
Q9: What is the required minimum number of scenario based training hours 
taught to new law enforcement officers in your state? 
120 
 
Q10: What percentage of training scenarios requires the discharge of a firearm to 
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correctly resolve the scenario? 
less than 5% 
 
Q11: What percentage of training scenarios requires the use of force other than 
the discharge of a firearm, such as the use of an electronic control device, baton, 
or OC spray, to correctly resolve the scenario? 
less than 5% 
 
Q12: What percentage of scenarios requires only de-escalation techniques to 






Q1: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Firearms? (safe-handling, cleaning, 
shooting, qualifying, etc.) 
72 
 
Q2: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Defensive Tactics? (inclusive of arrest 
techniques, ground fighting, Krav Maga, etc.) 
70 
 
Q3: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Impact weapons? 
minimum of 7 hours 
 
Q4: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Electronic Control Devices? 
0 
 
Q5: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on OC Spray? 
3 hours - classroom only (no exposure) 
 
Q6: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on De-escalation? 
0 as titled, but verbal skills, with physical alternatives are throughout the 
academy 
 
Q7: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Crisis Intervention? 
5 hours of Mental Health training 
 
Q8: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Use of force policy? 
0 - no single agencies UOF policy is taught 
 
Q9: What is the required minimum number of scenario based training hours 




Q10: What percentage of training scenarios requires the discharge of a firearm to 
correctly resolve the scenario?  
varied 
 
Q11: What percentage of training scenarios requires the use of force other than 
the discharge of a firearm, such as the use of an electronic control device, baton, 
or OC spray, to correctly resolve the scenario? 
varied 
 
Q12: What percentage of scenarios requires only de-escalation techniques to 








Q1: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Firearms? (safe-handling, cleaning, 
shooting, qualifying, etc.) 
66 
 
Q2: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Defensive Tactics? (inclusive of arrest 
techniques, ground fighting, Krav Maga, etc.) 
62 
 
Q3: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Impact weapons? 
4 
 
Q4: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Electronic Control Devices? 
none required 
 
Q5: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on OC Spray? 
4 
 
Q6: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on De-escalation? 
4 
 
Q7: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Crisis Intervention? 
6 
 
Q8: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Use of force policy? 
4 
 
Q9: What is the required minimum number of scenario based training hours 
taught to new law enforcement officers in your state? 
32 
 
Q10: What percentage of training scenarios requires the discharge of a firearm to 
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correctly resolve the scenario? 
2.5% 
 
Q11: What percentage of training scenarios requires the use of force other than 
the discharge of a firearm, such as the use of an electronic control device, baton, 
or OC spray, to correctly resolve the scenario? 
17.5% 
 
Q12: What percentage of scenarios requires only de-escalation techniques to 







Q1: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Firearms? (safe-handling, cleaning, 
shooting, qualifying, etc.) 
86 - not required but actual number being used 
 
Q2: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Defensive Tactics? (inclusive of arrest 
techniques, ground fighting, Krav Maga, etc.) 
123 - not required but actual number being used 
 
Q3: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Impact weapons? 
10 - not required but actual number being used 
 
Q4: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Electronic Control Devices? 
0 
 
Q5: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on OC Spray? 
6 - not required but actual number being used 
 
Q6: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on De-escalation? 
10+ - CIT, LEED, Excited Delirium 
 
Q7: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Crisis Intervention? 
8 - CIT 
 
Q8: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Use of force policy? 
4+ - not required but actual number being used 
 
Q9: What is the required minimum number of scenario based training hours 
taught to new law enforcement officers in your state? 
63 - not required but actual number being used 
 
Q10: What percentage of training scenarios requires the discharge of a firearm to 
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correctly resolve the scenario? 
less than 10% 
 
Q11: What percentage of training scenarios requires the use of force other than 
the discharge of a firearm, such as the use of an electronic control device, baton, 
or OC spray, to correctly resolve the scenario? 
less than 10% 
 
Q12: What percentage of scenarios requires only de-escalation techniques to 







Q1: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Firearms? (safe-handling, cleaning, 
shooting, qualifying, etc.) 
78.5 
 
Q2: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Defensive Tactics? (inclusive of arrest 
techniques, ground fighting, Krav Maga, etc.) 
65 
 
Q3: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Impact weapons? 
10 
 
Q4: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Electronic Control Devices? 
Zero 
 
Q5: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on OC Spray? 
3.5 
 
Q6: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on De-escalation? 
We train on the [sic] this concept throughout our interpersonal communications 
and other classes as well as out defense tactics, Firearms and Use of force. 
 
Q7: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Crisis Intervention? 
7 
 
Q8: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law 
enforcement officers in your state on Use of force policy? 
10 
 
Q9: What is the required minimum number of scenario based training hours 




Q10: What percentage of training scenarios requires the discharge of a firearm to 
correctly resolve the scenario? 
10% 
 
Q11: What percentage of training scenarios requires the use of force other than 
the discharge of a firearm, such as the use of an electronic control device, baton, 
or OC spray, to correctly resolve the scenario? 
50% 
 
Q12: What percentage of scenarios requires only de-escalation techniques to 





APPENDIX C. SURVEY STATISTICS 
(* signifies a non-numeric answer) 
Questions Return 1 Return 2 Return 3 Return 4 Return 5 
Firearms 56 0 40 80 60 
Defensive Tactics 58 0 40 80 70 
Impact weapons 8 0 20 40 8 
ECD 4 0 0 * 0 
OC spray 3 0 8 8 0 
De-escalation * 0 40 8 20 
Crisis Intervention 12 0 8 6 20 
U of F policy 4 0 8 24 6 
Scenario hours 42 0 60 800 * 
Firearms 10% 5% 5% * * 
other weapon 90% 10% 10% * * 
De-escalation * 5% 95% * * 
Questions Return 6 Return 7 Return 8 Return 9 Return 10 
Firearms 47 50 0 42 64 
Defensive Tactics 47 40 0 44.5 62 
Impact weapons 4 10 0 8 4 
ECD 0 0 0 4 0 
OC spray 2 5 0 8 0 
De-escalation 8 20 0 8 2 
Crisis Intervention 4 10 0 4 0 
U of F policy 8 15 0 4 2 
Scenario hours 16 skipped 0 104 14 
Firearms 5% 10% 10% 10% skipped 
other weapon 20% 20% 20% 25% skipped 
De-escalation 70% 70% * 65% skipped 
106 
Questions Return 11 Return 12 Return 13 Return 14 Return 15 
Firearms 48 72 66 86 78.5 
Defensive Tactics 40 70 62 123 65 
Impact weapons * 7 4 10 10 
ECD 0 0 0 0 0 
OC spray 0 3 4 6 3.5 
De-escalation 0 * 4 10 * 
Crisis Intervention 4 5 6 8 7 
U of F policy 5 0 4 4 10 
Scenario hours 120 20 32 63 60 
Firearms 5% * 2.5% 10% 10% 
other weapon 5% * 17.5% 10% 50% 
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